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Preface
Before laying out the actual synopsis of my research, I feel obliged to make a clarifying
remark regarding the word neurocognition, a term that I frequently use throughout this
thesis. Only recently, this very word has been mentioned among a list of 50 psychological
and psychiatric terms that should be avoided due to their inherent imprecision (Lilienfeld
et al., 2015). According to the authors of said list, all cognition is necessarily based upon
neural activity, making this compound a pleonasm. Going even further, they have likened
it to recently emerging neologisms, such as neuroeducation or neuropolitics, which—
according to the authors—use the prefix “neuro” as a means of persuasion (Lilienfeld
et al., 2015).
In my humble opinion, the word neurocognition is neither a pleonasm, nor is it comparable
to other neuro-compounds that might appear similar at first glance. Cognitive processes
are typically described at different levels of specification and precision. In many areas
of psychology, researchers refer to cognition and the processes it comprises as coarse,
broad, often overt aspects of behavior. For example, social psychologists might manipulate
whether or not participants attend to a group norm (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990).
However, attention is vaguely defined in this context, referring merely to an increased
propensity to observe or consider certain cues. By applying different techniques, such as
electrophysiological or neuroimaging methods, one can operationalize cognitive constructs
more precisely. For example, in many neuroscientific studies, all stimuli are observed
and consciously processed. Nevertheless, we might still be able to determine that some
of them are processed more deeply than others. What would appear to be the same
degree of attention in a behavioral sociopsychological context, where attention might be
roughly equivalent to observance or interest, would be divided into different qualities of
processing when taking a different methodological approach. While I would not suggest
that either of the perspectives is more appropriate than the other, it seems helpful to
openly acknowledge the level of analysis when talking about something as ill-defined as
cognition, especially in interdisciplinary contexts such as the present thesis. Therefore,
by using the term neurocognition, I clarify the level of resolution, the level of zoom into
the mind, that I surmise in my own and other researchers’ work.
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Specifically, my use of the term neurocognition conveys three relevant qualifications of how
I interpret and conduct psychological investigations. First, I take a cognitive approach to
behavior, believing that we can and need to disassemble macro-level processes of behavior
and experience into putative small-scale units of computation. Second, I infer, charac-
terize, and differentiate these cognitive processes in a somewhat fine-grained fashion,
typically based on direct measures of neural activity that are obtained with millisecond
precision. Third, by using this word, I acknowledge the constraints of my neurophysiolog-
ical assessments, since many measures of brain activity, such as in the present thesis, are
suitable proxies for cognitive processes, while they do not allow us to elucidate intricate
details of human neurobiology itself. This approach is by no means my very own, per-
sonal take on cognition, but a customary perspective in cognitive neuroscience (Amodio,
2010a). In fact, it might epitomize a commonly advocated understanding of psychology
based upon and enriched by, yet not completely absorbed in, biology (see Jancke & Peter-
mann, 2010). In any case, I wish to clarify that the use of the word neurocognition in the
present thesis is not necessarily as mindless and blemished as Lilienfeld and colleagues
(2015) would have us think it is.
Abstract
Human behavior and experience is far from independent; social norms, conveying what is
typical and appropriate in a given social group, thoroughly mold what we do, think, and
feel. While much is known about the motivational mechanisms of social influence based
on group norms, researchers have begun to decipher its neurocognitive principles only
recently. In this thesis, I provide a brief introduction into psychological investigations of
social influence and recently emerging neuroscientific research in this field. Moreover, I
extend previous findings and preliminary theories on the basis of eight original publica-
tions, which include one review article, one behavioral study, and six studies employing
event-related brain potentials (ERPs). Upon reviewing the existent literature, I have pro-
posed that norm-based social influence involves two core processes: (i) the differentiation
of social proof and deviance in neural circuits coding behavioral outcomes, and (ii) the
direct modulation of the neural representations of to-be-judged features. Moreover, my
colleagues and I have tested and clarified the validity of a common behavioral measure of
conformity as well as the functional significance of ERP components relevant to the inves-
tigation of outcome processing and sustained attention. Most importantly, we have built
upon our synthesis of the literature and our methodological studies and provide conclusive
findings that confirm and extend the proposed accounts of social influence. We demon-
strate that the differentiation of norms that confirm or contradict the individual’s own
views—thus constituting social proof or conveying social deviance, respectively—engages
both early and late processes of attentional prioritization. Episodes of social proof, as
well as stimuli associated with it, take precedence over those related to deviance. This
finding is replicated across different samples, tasks, and paradigms. We propose that
social norms feed into basic cognitive processes, similar to the value-informed deployment
of attentional resources. As a whole, my series of research corroborates the notion that
social influence is based upon some of our general cognitive faculties, such as outcome
valuation and reinforcement learning, and can entail modulations of even the most funda-
mental functions, such as perception and attention. This could explain the pervasiveness
of social influence on human behavior and experience, and it speaks to the timeliness and
relevance of exploring its neurocognitive foundations.
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Zusammenfassung
Menschliches Verhalten und Erleben ist alles andere als unabhängig; soziale Normen,
welche vermitteln, was in einer sozialen Gruppe üblich und angebracht ist, formen, was
wir tun, denken und fühlen. Während viel über die motivationalen Mechanismen von
sozialem Einfluss, der auf Normen basiert, bekannt ist, haben Forscher erst in letzter
Zeit damit begonnen, die zugrundeliegenden neurokognitiven Prinzipien zu entschlüsseln.
In dieser Dissertation liefere ich eine kurze Einführung in psychologische Untersuchun-
gen des sozialen Einflusses sowie in die neue neurowissenschaftliche Forschung in diesem
Feld. Außerdem erweitere ich vorhandene Befunde und vorläufige Theorien zur Neu-
rokognition des sozialen Einflusses auf der Grundlage von acht Originalarbeiten, welche
einen Übersichtsartikel, eine Verhaltensstudie sowie sechs Studien mit ereigniskorrelierten
Hirnpotenzialen (ERPs) umfassen. Nach Durchsicht der Literatur schlage ich vor, dass
Norm-basierter sozialer Einfluss zwei zentrale Prozesse beinhaltet: (i) die Unterscheidung
sozialer Bewährtheit und Abweichung in neuronalen Strukturen, die Verhaltenserträge
kodieren, und (ii) die unmittelbare Modifikation der neuronalen Repräsentationen zu
beurteilender Reizmerkmale. Darüber hinaus haben meine Kollegen und ich die Valid-
ität eines gängigen Verhaltensmaßes der Konformität und die funktionelle Signifikanz von
EKP-Komponenten, die für die Untersuchung von Ergebnisverarbeitung und anhaltender
Aufmerksamkeit von Bedeutung sind, getestet und klargestellt. Vor allem aber haben wir
auf unserer Synthese der Literatur und auf unseren methodologischen Studien aufgebaut
und präsentieren schlüssige Befunde, die die vorgeschlagenen Mechanismen des sozialen
Einflusses bestätigen und erweitern. So zeigen wir, dass die Differenzierung von Nor-
men, die die eigenen Ansichten unterstützen oder ihnen widersprechen und somit soziale
Bewährtheit oder soziale Devianz vermitteln, sowohl frühe als auch späte Prozesse at-
tentionaler Priorisierung beinhaltet. Episoden sozialer Bewährtheit und Reize, die damit
assoziiert sind, haben Vorrang gegenüber solchen, die mit sozialer Devianz assoziiert sind.
Diesen Befund konnten wir in verschiedenen Stichproben, Aufgaben und Paradigmen
replizieren. Wir schlagen vor, dass soziale Normen basale kognitive Prozesse beeinflussen,
ähnlich der wertabhängigen Ausrichtung von Aufmerksamkeitsressourcen. Insgesamt un-
terstreicht meine Forschungsreihe die Idee, dass sozialer Einfluss auf einigen unserer allge-
meinen kognitiven Fähigkeiten wie der Bewertung von Erträgen und Verstärkungslernen
xi
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basiert und Veränderungen selbst der grundlegendsten Funktionen wie Wahrnehmung
und Aufmerksamkeit zur Folge haben kann. Das könnte die Allgegenwärtigkeit von sozial
beeinflusstem Verhalten und Erleben erklären und unterstreicht die Aktualität und Be-
deutung der Untersuchung der neurokognitiven Grundlagen des sozialen Einflusses.
The only way we know it’s true is that we both dreamed it.
That’s what reality is. It’s a dream everyone has together.
Jeffrey Eugenides in Middlesex (2002)

1 Introduction
What do you do when you sit in the movie theater and get the faint impression of fumes
in the air? Most likely, you will assume that there is a fire nearby. Sniffing the unsettling
smell of smoke, your first instinct is to save yourself and potentially others as well by
yelling “Fire!” and storming out of the theater. On second thought, however, this seems
both foolish and, in a way, risky. You might simply be wrong and miss the rest of a
promising movie. Moreover, you can easily imagine what the others would think of you
if there was no actual fire. If your response was so aberrant, because what you smell is
actually a bucket of slightly overcooked popcorn, the other people in the theater would
certainly think you are a dramatic person who gets overly excited and imaginative when
watching a movie in the dark. Pondering these potential costs of falsely raising an alarm,
you just remain in your seat. And what you would most certainly do then, instinctively
and naturally, would be to look around yourself to find out whether anybody else in the
theater seems as discomposed as you. If no one did, you would most likely call your first
impression into question, trying to find out if what you smell really is the smoke of a fire.
But if you did evidence enough people turning their heads and sniffing dubiously, you
would decide that you were right: There is a fire and you should get out of the theater.
The above example foreshadows several components of the psychological phenomena and
processes that will be introduced, investigated, and discussed in the present thesis. First,
we are social beings, constantly surrounding ourselves with other people. Therefore, much
of what is intriguing about our species is how we behave within or in relation to groups.
Second, we are aware of other people’s expectations regarding our own behavior and fear
the consequences of our deviance, even if it is only the impression we make that is at
stake. Third, and most importantly, we closely monitor the behavior of those around us
not only—perhaps not even primarily—to discern their expectations, but to compare our
own take on reality with theirs. We try to find proof for what we assume to be accurate.
As Deutsch and Gerard (1955, p. 635) put it: “It is not surprising that the judgments of
others [...] should be taken as evidence to be weighed in coming to one’s own judgment.
From birth on, we learn that the perceptions and judgments of others are frequently
reliable sources of evidence about reality.”
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The process of using other people’s judgments to validate one’s own views and facilitate
decision-making is widely “underappreciated” (Cialdini, 2007). Its influence on a per-
son’s behavior is, however, well-documented. For example, learning through the media
that others have chosen to kill themselves as a means to deal with their problems en-
courages some people to commit suicide as well, often in the specific way in which the
initial suicide conveyed through the media was committed (see, e.g., Niederkrotenthaler
et al., 2010; Phillips, 1980; Phillips & Carstensen, 1986; but see Wasserman, 1984). This
phenomenon—dubbed Werther effect in reference to Goethe’s 1774 novel Die Leiden des
jungen Werther, which prompted a series of self-killings upon its original publication
(Phillips, 1974)—is a dramatic example of the impact of a person’s perception of viable
behavior on his or her choices (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Such influences are, however, not
necessarily as devastating as the Werther effect. For example, awareness of how much
energy other people save or money they give to charities greatly affects our own energy-
saving and charitable donations (Allcott, 2011; Croson, Handy, & Shang, 2009; Schultz,
Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). In the movie-theater example men-
tioned above, confirming one’s vague impression of danger by examining other people’s
behavior could help the individual survive by eventually following through on an intuitive
response. In essence, relying on others when validating one’s assumptions of reality is
not reprehensible per se; instead, it mostly represents a well-adapted strategy to evaluate
the appropriateness of one’s view of the complexities of the world (Claidière & Whiten,
2012).
1.1 Experimental Demonstrations of Social Influence
Both scientific assessment and individual experience tell us that a person’s behavior is
hardly the plain effigy of an independent processor’s covert workings. Rather, our atti-
tudes, judgments, and actions are thoroughly molded by the intricate context in which
they occur. At the beginning of the 20th century, Wilhelm Wundt, regarded by many
as the founder of academic psychology (Blumenthal, 1975; Fahrenberg, 2012; Jüttemann,
2007; Titchener, 1921), was among the first to acknowledge the need for a scientific explo-
ration of the complex social forces that act upon the individual (Farr, 1983; Greenwood,
2003). And to this day, it is precisely the premise of social psychology that the interper-
sonal context, real or imagined, largely determines our actions and cognitions (Allport,
1959; Gergen, 1985; Mischel, 2004).
Although social influence often occurs in plain sight and to some might have an air of
triviality, dexterous experimentation is still needed to formally describe and, eventually,
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fully understand it. In fact, some portrayals of this seemingly mundane phenomenon
have reverberated strongly throughout society, well beyond the realms of academia. One
of these studies was Stanley Milgram’s (1963) demonstration of how individuals obeyed
the orders of a blunt authority and ostensibly punished innocent others. Another one
was the rousing depiction of questionable norms and practices in a simulated prison at
Stanford University (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973). The fact that both studies have
repeatedly been the subject of feature films—with the latest movie on each study released
as recently as 2015—is testament to the stir these studies have caused.
Given their medial appeal and the luridness of their secondary dissemination, Milgram and
Zimbardo’s studies (Haney et al., 1973; Milgram, 1963) have left an undeniable imprint on
laypersons’ understanding of social influence. Although the reception and interpretation
of both studies remain controversial, they are widely regarded as documenting that the
alignment of one’s actions or beliefs to those of others is equivalent to the subjugation of
an individual’s will and reason (Haslam & Reicher, 2012). What tends to be overlooked,
however, is that social influence is by no means as simple as that; it is neither as distinctly
condemnable, nor as easily explained as one might assume.
In fact, two research programs that were far less dazzling formed the foundation of the
scientific study of social influence. Decades before the abovementioned research on obedi-
ence, Muzafer Sherif investigated in a series of laboratory studies the formation of group
norms and how they shaped what the members of the group appeared to perceive (Sherif,
1935). Twenty years later, Solomon E. Asch likewise studied the influence of a group dur-
ing a perceptual, albeit considerably easier task (Asch, 1951, 1955, 1956). Together with
their subsequent consolidation in a unified framework on the motivational basis of confor-
mity (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; see also Campbell & Fairey, 1989), these two experimental
approaches marked the true beginning of the science of social influence. Ever since, many
questions have been asked and a myriad of findings as well as a handful of theoretical
accounts have been put forth to answer them (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). By that, we
have gained a detailed and refined understanding of how others affect ourselves.
Just as academic psychology as a whole has undergone a series of transitions in the last
century, moving from early psychophysics to behaviorism to cognitivism to neuroscience
(Shiraev, 2014), the study of social influence has been dominated by varying currents.
Early research focused largely on demonstrating the sheer existence of conformal behav-
ior (Asch, 1955; Sherif, 1935) and explaining its motivational underpinnings (Deutsch &
Gerard, 1955). In essence, scholars sought to clarify why people conformed to others:
What were their motives, their goals in doing so? Slightly later, research began to shift
from motivation to mechanisms, as conformity was explained in comprehensive frame-
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works on dual modes of cognitive processing (Axsom, Yates, & Chaiken, 1987; Chaiken,
1980; Chen, Shechter, & Chaiken, 1996). The question that was now being asked was
whether a certain cognitive style triggered the heuristic reliance on other people’s behav-
ior. And finally, only little more than a decade ago, researchers began studying the neural
principles of social influence (Berns et al., 2005). Since then, several investigations have
tried to elucidate which brain networks and neural computations are involved in this type
of behavior (see Stallen & Sanfey, 2015).
Over the decades, the science of social influence has evolved into a broad and diverse field
of research. Obviously, several different phenomena can be subsumed under this term,
such as compliance with requests, obedience to authorities, and conformity to norms
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). They all share the idea that a relevant factor in individual
behavior is the surrounding social forces. What they differ in, essentially, is the specific
type of force: While some forces are clearly purposeful (orders and requests), others accrue
somewhat incidentally within groups (norms). It is the latter form of social influence
that follows the tradition of Asch (1956) and Sherif (1935), who already focused on the
assimilation to others in the absence of an explicit demand for such adjustment. And it is
precisely this type of influence that I have studied in the context of the present thesis.
1.2 Aims of the Present Thesis
The aims of the present thesis are to give an overview of how previous work on the
neurocognition of social influence can be synthesized and to introduce a series of novel
contributions to this field. My colleagues and I have used psychophysiological and behav-
ioral experiments to study how basic mental operations are involved in this phenomenon.
After introducing the general issues at hand and providing a common ground regard-
ing both contents and relevant methods, I will summarize pertinent studies in this field,
integrate them, and directly expand their interpretation on the basis of my own investiga-
tions. Although my own experimental work is primarily based on an electrophysiological
approach, this thesis complies with recent demands for a psychologically grounded social
neuroscience (Amodio, 2010a; Bartholow, 2010) and is intended to inform both classical
psychological and contemporary neurocognitive theory.
At the heart of the present thesis is a straightforward scenario: an individual making judg-
ments shortly after or before learning about the judgment of others. As will be explained
in more detail later, this captures the basic configuration of every-day decision-making
in a social context (Rilling & Sanfey, 2011) and follows an old tradition of laboratory re-
search on group influence (Asch, 1955; Crutchfield, 1955; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Sherif,
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1935). Moreover, the simplicity and the tight structure of this scenario allow us to track
not only the behavioral consequences of social influence, but also the underlying mental
processes. In several experimental studies, we recorded electroencephalography (EEG),
from which we derived event-related brain potentials (ERPs). As certain deflections of the
ERP are well-established signatures of specific cognitive functions (Amodio, Bartholow,
& Ito, 2013), we thus gained inside into the processes that are involved in situations of
social influence.
1.3 Outline of the Synopsis
The core of the present cumulative thesis is a series of eight journal articles, written and
published over the course of the last three years. This includes one review article, one
paper based on a methodological behavioral study, and six papers in which we report
novel ERP studies. The publications will be introduced, discussed, and integrated into
the existing literature in the present synopsis. It should be noted that this text is not
intended to fully substitute all of the articles that it connects. Each article comprises
plenty of experimental details, intricate analyses, explorations, as well as both skeptical
and complaisant evaluations of the research presented therein. This level of detail and
depth will not be achieved in the synopsis. Rather, I aim to carve out the interrelation
as well as the cumulative and incremental contributions of my research. Therefore, the
central ideas and key findings of all studies will be laid out, yet some details will have to
be left out. Also, I will not divide this synopsis into two entirely separate sections, one
dedicated to previous studies and one covering my own work. Instead, I will derive general
conclusions based on the synthesis of my own and other scholars’ findings both during and
after the presentation of my research. Even though this synopsis will suffice to understand
all of the studies upon which the present thesis is based, the interested reader is referred
to the eight original publications to understand and evaluate the research therein even
more profoundly (for an overview of the papers, see Table 1).
In Publication I (Schnuerch & Gibbons, 2014), we summarized and integrated several
publications on the cognitive and neurophysiological foundations of social conformity. As
neuroscientific research on social influence has only emerged over the last decade, much
of it is only vaguely connected and still represents a somewhat heuristic exploration of
possible neural correlates and principles. It was our aim to structure the work published
to that date and distill the mechanisms that are recognized across different studies.
As our synthesis of the literature showed that several studies point toward the possibility
that the representation of to-be-judged information plays a key role in social conformity,
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we employed ERPs in Publication II (Schnuerch, Koppehele-Gossel, & Gibbons, 2015) to
measure the depth of stimulus processing. By this, we were able to support the claim
that superficial, as compared to elaborate, processing of what is currently being judged
is associated with greater conformity.
In the majority of my studies, I investigated how we evaluate the appropriateness of our
own behavior in light of social norms, focusing on the role of attentional processes in norm-
based social influence. In addition to exploring the neurocognition of social influence, I
specifically used novel experimental data to address the validity and functional significance
of behavioral and neurophysiological indices of how we process norms in comparison to
our own judgments. In Publication III (Schnuerch, Schnuerch, & Gibbons, 2015), we
demonstrated how an intuitive assessment of the corrective effects of social norms on
individual behavior is strongly inflated by the unwanted contribution of regression toward
the mean. Also, we proposed a straightforward mathematical procedure based upon
a hierarchical linear model to correct for this inflation. In Publication IV (Gibbons,
Schnuerch, & Stahl, 2016), we investigated the nature and mediators of the feedback
negativity (FN), a well-established brain potential related to outcome evaluation (Miltner,
Braun, & Coles, 1997) that is relevant to reinforcement learning in social contexts as well.
Similarly, Publication V (Furley, Schnuerch, & Gibbons, 2016) highlights the role of the
late positive complex (LPC) as an index of sustained, motivated attention toward relevant
stimuli (Liu, Huang, McGinnis-Deweese, Keil, & Ding, 2012; Sutton & Ruchkin, 1984),
particularly in regard to basic social and affective features.
To specifically test the role of outcome processing and attentional selection in social
influence, three studies with varying paradigms were run that yielded converging and
complementary findings. In Publication VI (Schnuerch, Trautmann-Lengsfeld, Bertram,
& Gibbons, 2014), we studied neural signatures of social proof and deviance, derived
from the comparison of one’s own and other people’s judgment. Specifically, we focused
on the FN, probing and extending Festinger’s (1954) prediction that the experience of so-
cial deviance can lead to the evasion of the respective reference group. In Publication VII
(Schnuerch & Gibbons, 2015), we replicated our own and other scholars’ previous findings
on the neurocognitive foundations of social proof in a novel experimental paradigm. Also,
we found evidence of the involvement of attentional-selection processes and of sustained
effects of social (dis)agreement on stimulus processing. In Publication VIII (Schnuerch,
Richter, Koppehele-Gossel, & Gibbons, 2016), we show that similar neurocognitive pro-
cesses are involved under more ecologically valid conditions.
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Table 1: Publications included in the present thesis
Publication Full Reference
I Schnuerch, R., & Gibbons, H. (2014). A review of neurocognitive
mechanisms of social conformity. Social Psychology, 6, 466–478.
II Schnuerch, R., Koppehele-Gossel, J., & Gibbons, H. (2015). Weak
encoding of faces predicts socially influenced judgments of facial attrac-
tiveness. Social Neuroscience, 10, 624–634.
III Schnuerch, R., Schnuerch, M., & Gibbons, H. (2015). Assessing and
correcting for regression toward the mean in deviance-induced social
conformity. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 669.
IV Gibbons, H., Schnuerch, R., & Stahl, J. (2016). From positivity to
negativity bias: Ambiguity affects the neurophysiological signatures of
feedback processing. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 28, 542–557.
V Furley*, P., Schnuerch*, R., & Gibbons, H. (2016). The winner takes
it all: Event-related brain potentials reveal enhanced motivated atten-
tion toward athletes’ nonverbal signals of leading. Social Neuroscience.
Advance online publication. [* joint first authorship]
VI Schnuerch, R., Trautmann-Lengsfeld, S. A., Bertram, M., & Gibbons,
H. (2014). Neural sensitivity to social deviance predicts attentive pro-
cessing of peer-group judgment. Social Neuroscience, 9, 650–660.
VII Schnuerch, R., & Gibbons, H. (2015). Social proof in the human brain:
Electrophysiological signatures of agreement and disagreement with the
majority. Psychophysiology, 52, 1328–1342.
VIII Schnuerch, R., Richter, J., Koppehele-Gossel, J., & Gibbons, H.
(2016). Multiple neural signatures of social proof and deviance dur-
ing the observation of other people’s preferences. Psychophysiology, 53,
823–836.
Note. Publications are sorted based on their interrelation and the order of studies as presented in the
main text, rather than by the date of publication.
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2 Social Influence
Social influence is a rich and complex aspect of human behavior and, accordingly, an
equally widespread field of research. As mentioned above, there are several phenomena
and processes that can be subsumed under this term. However, neither the term itself nor
the labels for the variety of phenomena it comprises are used consistently throughout the
literature. There is considerable variation in what scholars understand by various forms
of social influence (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). It is therefore necessary to provide a rough
overview and establish a certain terminological and definitional basis for the work laid
out in the present thesis.
A frequently cited taxonomy is the notion that social influence comprises two types of
behavior: conformity and compliance (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). This choice of terms is
slightly confusing, as one subtype of conformity is also called compliance (Maass & Clark,
1983). Moreover, there is some inconsistency in the literature as to how conformity and
compliance relate to the concept of social norms (see, e.g., Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Fehr &
Fischbacher, 2004; Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000). Perhaps the most comprehensive
and parsimonious overview of the functional and terminological relation between norms
and socially adjusted behavior was proposed only very recently (McDonald & Crandall,
2015). Mainly—although not exclusively—based upon this approach, I will define the
relevant concepts in the following.
2.1 Compliance
Undoubtedly, compliance is one of the most relevant and most commonly discussed man-
ifestations of social influence. A typical definition is that compliance is an acquiescent
adjustment of individual behavior in response to a request (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Re-
quests need not include an explicit appeal, such as when adverts emphasize the good
qualities of a product without literally asking the observer to buy it (see Cialdini & Gold-
stein, 2004). However, a defining feature of compliance is that there is an explicit intent
behind the process of social influence; that is, the individual’s adjustment is the inten-
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tion, usually of a single person or entity, such as a company or a team. In this regard,
it clearly differs from the much more incidental influence of social norms, which neither
requires, nor typically involves, someone’s overt intention to influence the individual (see,
e.g., Asch, 1955).
Although the conceptualization of compliance as a separate facet of social influence is
well-established (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004), it hardly works as distinctly as common
modular models suggest. For example, although compliance with a request can clearly be
differentiated from conformity to social norms from a procedural view (Cialdini & Gold-
stein, 2004), norms are actually frequently used as part of strategies aimed at inducing
compliance (Jacobson, Mortensen, Jacobson, & Cialdini, 2015). Activating a concept of
how most people act (a descriptive norm) is an effective tool in persuading us to follow
an appeal (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008; Schultz et al., 2007). Typical claims
such as “this year’s best-selling brand” or “up to two thirds of our customers opt for
energy-efficient heating” are based upon this very concept (Cialdini, 2007).
A particularly striking example of compliance is individual adjustment induced by author-
itative orders. This notion relies on a striking demonstration of obedience in Milgram’s
highly publicized Yale studies (Milgram, 1963, 1965a, 1965b). Milgram expressly aimed
to go beyond the exploration of conformity, on which Asch, one of his mentors and super-
visors, focused and which Milgram himself had studied as well (Milgram, 1961). As doc-
umented by Russel (2011), Milgram was adamant about finding out whether the force of
others would also be measurable once the individual was asked to make relevant decisions
under social pressure—rather than completely inconsequential perceptual judgments, as
typically investigated in Asch’s experiments (Asch, 1951, 1955, 1956). Moreover, Milgram
aimed to clarify, in a random American sample, whether individuals would indeed fully
succumb to authoritative orders. As we know today, this proved to be the case, which
inspired a vivid empirical and theoretical discourse (see, e.g., Blass, 1991, 1999, 2009;
Burger, 2009; Reicher & Haslam, 2011; Slater et al., 2006).
Research on compliance is not only perplexing, but it also holds evident political relevance.
Among other things, it might help us appreciate the role of authoritarian hierarchies in
molding individual behavior (Milgram, 1965b; Russell, 2011). Albeit inspired by and
related to research on conformity (Haslam & Reicher, 2012), compliant behavior, such as
obedience to authorities, represents a separate, perhaps even more complex facet of the
social nature of human conduct. When investigating conformity, as in the present thesis, it
thus seems ill-advised to draw seemingly parallel conclusions regarding compliance. Also,
most studies on the neurocognition of social influence have focused on conformity to group
norms (see Stallen & Sanfey, 2015). Therefore, only little reference to the clearly related,
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yet essentially different aspect of compliance with requests will be made throughout this
thesis.
2.2 Conformity
Although conformity is a ubiquitous, commonly-used term, precise definitions are scarce.
As noted by Cialdini and Trost (1998), it is often used to describe the act of adopting other
people’s behavior by moving away from one’s own stance. Defined this way, conformity
only occurs when an individual adopts group behavior even though it contradicts his or
her initial view. “Thus, we conform to others when perceived or real pressure from them
causes us to act differently from how we would act if alone [...]” (Cialdini & Trost, 1998,
p. 162). This definition demarcates a firm border between conformity and normative
behavior, as norms do not necessarily cause a shift in the individual’s behavior and need
not contradict a person’s own view.
There is, however, good reason to forego such a strict definition of conformity. First, the
narrow definition might simply be a convention based upon the early use of the word,
particularly in Asch’s well-received publications (1951, 1955, 1956). Second, there are
several authors who define the concept more broadly, describing even the adjustment to
group behavior under uncertainty—when there is no apparent contradiction between a
person’s stance and a group’s aberrant view—as conformity (Insko, Smith, Alicke, Wade,
& Taylor, 1985; Walther et al., 2002; see also Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Only recently,
the term has been used to simply describe that an individual chooses a certain behavior
because it is the most frequent in others (Claidière & Whiten, 2012). Third, and most
importantly, it seems parsimonious to apply an inclusive definition that allows us to link,
rather than demarcate, our conceptions of norms and conformity. Conformity might thus
be defined simply as a person’s adjustment to a social norm (McDonald & Crandall,
2015). Throughout the present thesis, I adhere to this definition.
One central question regarding the nature of conformity is what motives lead an individual
to adopt the group’s behavior. Based on the premise that our behavior in a social context
is goal-oriented and serves individual purposes (Cialdini & Trost, 1998), two central mo-
tives for conformity have been identified (Asch, 1955; Campbell & Fairey, 1989; Deutsch
& Gerard, 1955), both of which serve a superordinate, somewhat general quest (Cialdini
& Trost, 1998; Wood, 2000). The first basic goal is to be accurate in our judgments and
in our take on reality; the second basic goal is to be affiliated and socially accepted; the
superordinate goal is to maintain a positive self-concept by establishing and confirming
that we are accurate and affiliated (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). The processes of social
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impact on individual behavior based on the two basic motives, accuracy and affiliation,
have been labeled informational and normative influence, respectively.
2.2.1 Informational Influence
We often conform to others because we use them as a reliable source of information that
allows us to enhance the quality of our own judgments or even our own representation of
reality (Campbell & Fairey, 1989; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Insko et al., 1985). In Sherif’s
(1935) seminal experiments, participants sat in the dark and were asked to indicate how
much a small dot that was projected onto the wall moved around. In fact, the dot
did not move at all, yet one automatically gets the impression of movement after some
time (the so-called autokinetic effect). Not much surprisingly, this task is extremely
difficult, as it is virtually impossible to assess how wide the corridor of movement is.
In this uncertain situation, it is helpful to either copy other people’s judgment or at
least to verify whether one’s vague impression of the size of the apparent movement is
supported by others. To this end, we compare our own and other people’s judgments. If
we experience a strong deviation from the most prevalent response, we will be tempted
to adjust our own judgment in the group’s direction or even to adopt its judgment—not
just in our public response, but in our own private understanding as well. Therefore,
informational influence can entail the private acceptance of the majority’s judgment,
implying an updating (conversion) of the individual’s own actual views (Kelman, 1961).
2.2.2 Normative Influence
Perhaps the more striking demonstrations of group influence—which originally coined the
term conformity in social psychology—involved an adjustment of individual behavior to
an obviously incorrect group against better judgment, such as in Asch’s seminal line-
judgment studies (Asch, 1951, 1955, 1956). In these experiments, participants were asked
to indicate which of three comparison lines was shown on a card displaying one single line.
Importantly, the lines were noticeably different, and control participants who completed
this task alone performed near perfection, with a mean error rate of 1% (Friend, Raf-
ferty, & Bramel, 1990). Participants who performed the task in a group, which actually
consisted of confederates of the experimenter whose answers had been scripted before-
hand, gave 33% incorrect responses on average, as they followed the majority’s openly
erroneous responses. As revealed in subsequent interviews, and later supported by inde-
pendent studies and targeted manipulations, a typical motive for adjustment in the “Asch
task” was to avoid standing out by deviating from the majority’s expectations (Deutsch &
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Gerard, 1955). Usually, such normative influence results only in public compliance with
the group, without a true adoption of majority responses as correct assessments of reality
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Cialdini & Trost, 1998).
2.3 Social Norms
The concept of social norms has long been controversial and its power in explaining human
behavior has been challenged (Cialdini et al., 1990). Even today, some researchers argue
that our understanding of norms is vague at best (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Krupka
& Weber, 2013). Although the latter view—potentially triggered by an eclectic focus on
norms in economic behavior—is disputable, there is no denying the need for novel research
to further what we know in this field (see, e.g., Hogg & Reid, 2006).
McDonald and Crandall (2015) recently defined social norms as “expectation[s] about
appropriate behavior that occurs in a group context” (p. 147). It should be noted that
the key concept here is “appropriate behavior”, which is somewhat inclusive and covers
different forms of normative standards. According to the widely adopted Focus Theory
of Normative Conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990; Kallgren et al., 2000), two types of norms
can be differentiated. Descriptive norms simply denote what is most common within a
social group (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; McDonald & Crandall, 2015). That is, they convey
the most prevalent (i.e., the majority’s) behavior (Cialdini et al., 1990). Injunctive norms
are not merely descriptive, but rather prescriptive—in the sense of conveying what ought
to be done or what is approved of in a given group (McDonald & Crandall, 2015). The
differentiation of the two types is not purely an effort to arrange our concept of norms.
Rather, it reflects profound variations in their nature.
2.3.1 Descriptive Norms
Descriptive norms provide helpful guidance as to which type of behavior is likely correct
in a certain situation. Conversely, the process of following descriptive norms is conformity
based on informational social influence (McDonald & Crandall, 2015). Whenever we are
insecure about how we should act, the behavior that is most common within a group can
be interpreted as the best guess at what is currently appropriate (Cialdini & Goldstein,
2004). Such reliance on the majority under uncertainty is particularly pronounced when
correct decisions are rewarded or urgently needed (coleman1958; Baron, Vandello, &
Brunsman, 1996). Therefore, abiding by descriptive norms can be described as a heuristic
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recourse to the simple rule of thumb that “consensus implies correctness” (Axsom et al.,
1987). As the informational value of descriptive norms is often more than a simple
instruction as to how one should behave to act appropriately, such norms often help us
validate and adjust our own view of the world (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).
2.3.2 Injunctive Norms
The basis of injunctive norms is the expectation of the group (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Of-
ten, there are more or less explicitly voiced, sometimes completely arbitrary expectations
regarding the behavior of individuals within a group. To gain or maintain the approval
of others, it is thus necessary to abide by these rules. This usually happens without con-
version of the individual’s beliefs; rather, he or she merely acquiesces to the majority’s
judgment or behavior (Kelman, 1961). Thus, following injunctive norms is what is usually
described as conformity due to the normative influence of the group (McDonald & Cran-
dall, 2015). Such abidance by norms can likewise be described as a heuristic strategy;
this one, however, is based on the—presumably reasonable—guideline “go along to get
along” (Chen et al., 1996).
Some theorists argue for a third type of norm: subjective norms (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).
They represent a person’s assumption about how closely related parties, such as family and
friends, expect him or her to behave (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Therefore, subjective norms
could be regarded as an extension or qualification of the concept of injunctive norms,
reflecting not the objective expectations of others, but a person’s subjective representation
of what a group approves of. This refinement of the typology of norms is, however, not
commonly adopted in contemporary theories (see, e.g., McDonald & Crandall, 2015).
2.4 Social Proof and Deviance
An essential part of the process by which we get influenced by social groups is the com-
parison between our own and other people’s behavior. In a groundbreaking theoretical
paper, Leon Festinger (1954) proposed that social comparison is a core process of human
cognition. This is consistent with the assertion that—well beyond the social domain—all
stimulation is processed in relation to a normative standard (Kahneman & Miller, 1986).
The general reliance on comparative processing appears to be a well-adapted strategy
that does not only afford us the opportunity to gain valuable knowledge of ourselves
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(Mussweiler & Rüter, 2003), but also makes us more certain (Mussweiler & Posten, 2012)
and more efficient (Mussweiler & Epstude, 2009) in our judgments.
The central tenet of Festinger’s (1954) Theory of Social Comparison Processes is that
we constantly try to evaluate our own “opinions and abilities” (Festinger, 1954, p. 117).
Whenever no objective reference is available, we consult other people’s behavior to assess
our own accuracy, thus trying to find social proof for our views (Cialdini, Wosinska, Bar-
rett, Butner, & Gornik-Durose, 1999). In case we find proof, we maintain our previously
held opinion. If, however, we register our own social deviance, we usually correct our
judgments, such that they match the group’s or, at least, lie closer to them. The farther
we deviate from others, the stronger will be our tendency to correct ourselves (Festinger,
1954). Alternatively, we might attempt to change the group’s views rather than shift our
own, which does, however, depend on our means to actually affect the course of the group
(Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969). Interestingly, a different approach to deal with
the ongoing perception of social deviance is to simply terminate or avoid the comparison
of our own and certain other people’s behavior (Festinger, 1954).
The human tendency to assert social proof or deviance should be a particularly pivotal
mechanism of conformity driven by the informational value of descriptive social norms.
In uncertain situations, comparative thinking allows us to reduce the level of uncertainty
by using the judgments of the majority (i.e., the descriptive norm) as a point of reference
and incorporating them into our own. A straightforward example of this process is the
formation of judgments in Sherif’s dot-motion experiments (Sherif, 1935). The individual
only has a vague impression of the degree of motion, which he or she then obviously
compares with other people’s judgments, leading to a steady, gradual approximation of
the individual’s responses to the group’s or—in case of two respondents—to each other
(Sherif, 1935).
Most of the theories that specifically aim to explain social influence (see, e.g., Camp-
bell & Fairey, 1989; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Latané, 1981;
Tanford & Penrod, 1984) focus on what might be called macro-level processes, primarily
the motivational underpinnings of socially adjusted behavior (for a similar discussion, see
Germar, Schlemmer, Krug, Voss, & Mojzisch, 2014). To give an example: The notion
that our general goal of maintaining a favorable self-concept drives our pursuit of accuracy
and affiliation in social decision-making (Cialdini & Trost, 1998) does imply the contri-
bution of certain cognitions (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). What it does not encompass,
though, is a proposal of specific components of cognitive processing that are involved in
social influence. Social-comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), however, basically premises
the existence of a somewhat universal component of social cognition that is essential for
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social influence. One might say that it thus provides the groundwork for our scientific
assessment and subsequent understanding of the neurocognitive principles of social influ-
ence. Not surprisingly, much of the recent research on the physiological, cognitive, and
neurocomputational foundations of social influence has focused on the role of comparison
processes (see, e.g., Chen, Zhong, et al., 2012; Izuma & Adolphs, 2013; Kim, Liss, Rao,
Singer, & Compton, 2012; Klucharev, Hytönen, Rijpkema, Smidts, & Fernández, 2009;
Klucharev, Munneke, Smidts, & Fernández, 2011; Shestakova et al., 2013)
Although the assumed comparison mechanism is strikingly simple, it seems expedient to
explicitly deconstruct from a modern-day cognitive perspective what Festinger’s (1954)
theory—mostly devised in broader, socioscientific terms—actually implies. The corrective
impact of the descriptive norm first requires the mental availability of one’s own view (or
judgment) as well as the norm. Based upon those pieces of information, the cognitive
system must afford an internal juxtaposition of both views. Finally, this comparison
must be translated into an evaluation, that is, into a score representing the quality (e.g.,
direction) and quantity (i.e., the degree) of one’s deviation from or agreement with the
group. This, then, ought to feed both into subsequent cognitive processing and into the
individual’s judgment (Festinger, 1954).
3 Methodology
Before turning to the central part of the synopsis, covering the neurocognitive principles of
social influence, it is necessary to establish a firm methodological ground for the upcoming
sections. As noted earlier, most of my own research is based on the assessment and
analysis of ERPs, as are several other recent studies on social influence (Chen, Zhong,
et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2012; Kimura, Murayama, Miura, & Katayama, 2013; Shestakova
et al., 2013; Trautmann-Lengsfeld & Herrmann, 2013, 2014; Yu & Sun, 2013). Conversely,
I will provide a brief introduction into the neurophysiological rationale and technique of
EEG and ERPs. However, as in cognitive neuroscience in general, functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) has become the dominant method in social neuroscience (see
Amodio et al., 2013; Singer, 2012). Not much surprisingly, a significant portion of studies
into the neurocognition of social influence are based upon fMRI (for an overview, see
Izuma, 2013; Stallen & Sanfey, 2015). Therefore, I shall additionally provide a very brief
introduction into this technique.
3.1 Event-Related Brain Potentials (ERPs)
ERPs represent a well-established and widely-used method in cognitive neuroscience (see,
e.g., Coles, 1989; Fabiani, Gratton, & Coles, 2000; Luck, 2005; Shah et al., 2004). One of
the defining features of this technique is that brain activity is measured directly (Amodio
et al., 2013), distinguishing it from fMRI, which is based upon an indirect inference of
neural activity (Bartholow & Amodio, 2009; Logothetis, 2002). ERPs have a remarkable
temporal resolution, allowing us to track with millisecond precision how specific neural
processes evolve over a certain period of time (Fabiani et al., 2000). Crucially, a vast body
of previous research has established the functional relation between cognitive processes
and ERP signatures, enabling us to infer otherwise concealed mental processes based on
the shape and timing of ERPs (Amodio, 2010a). They are therefore deemed an invaluable
tool in monitoring cognitive processing in the human brain in real-time (Amodio et al.,
2013; Coles, 1989).
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A notable shortcoming of ERPs is their low spatial resolution. As voltage fluctuations
registered at the scalp are potentially explained by an infinite number of different com-
binations of neural generators (Luck, 2005), the source of brain activity measured by
ERPs remains uncertain (Fabiani et al., 2000). This is typically referred to as the inverse
problem (see Darvas, Pantazis, Kucukaltun-Yildirim, & Leahy, 2004). According to Luck
(2005), it is currently impossible to assess the margin of error of an ERP-source estima-
tion, such that “the spatial resolution of the ERP technique is fundamentally undefined”
(p. 25). This stands in stark contrast to fMRI, whose spatial resolution is not only known,
but often as high as in the range of a few millimeters (Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby,
2006; Yoo, Talos, Golby, Black, & Panych, 2004). It should be noted, however, that sev-
eral techniques, particularly mathematical routines to estimate potential electrical dipole
sources, have been devised to address the problem of generator localization in ERPs (see,
e.g., Luck, 2005; Pascual-Marqui, 2002; Wagner, Fuchs, & Kastner, 2004).
3.1.1 Neurophysiological Background
The basis of ERPs is the EEG, a continuous recording of voltages, emanating from the
brain, on the surface of the scalp. Building upon previous work in animals, Hans Berger
famously conducted the first human EEG at the University of Jena in 1929 (Berger,
1929; Haas, 2003). Whereas psychiatric and psychological research using EEG originally
focused on spontaneously occurring oscillations of voltage, scholars later began to assess
variations in brain activity induced by specific events: ERPs (see Fabiani et al., 2000). To
extract ERPs from EEG data, a large number of certain epochs taken from the continuous
recording is averaged. Each epoch represents the overall neural response recorded during
and directly after the occurrence of the event of interest (e.g., a certain stimulus class).
Averaging several repetitions of the same event cancels out the random noise generated by
the unsystematic, continuous brain activity measured in the EEG. The systematic pattern
of activity specifically induced by the crucial event, however, is selectively preserved during
this procedure (Luck, 2005). The electrophysiological source of an ERP is activity in a
certain area (or several areas) of the brain. However, the relation between the brain’s
most fundamental currency—the firing of neurons—and the appearance of the ERP is
somewhat indirect, as Luck (2005) asserts in his seminal volume, upon which the following
simplified description is primarily based.
When a neuron receives input from another, usually via a neurochemical transmitter, ion
channels in the postsynaptic membrane close or open. This often results in a postsynaptic
potential, that is, a change of the flow and balance of ions along the membrane. Several
postsynaptic potentials usually occur simultaneously at several points of synaptic contact;
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for example, at various apical dendrites of a neuron. The summation of these potentials
then leads to a change of voltage in the broader area of the postsynaptic neuron where the
neurotransmitter made contact with it. In the case of excitatory potentials, the charge
around the apical synapses, where the postsynaptic potential develops, is negative. At
the opposing end of the neuron, a compensatory flow of ions occurs, leading to a positive
charge. Consequently, the synaptically stimulated, apical and the non-activated, proximal
part of the neuron have opposing electrical charges. This relative difference gives rise to an
electrical dipole along the neuron (i.e., an arrangement of two neighboring, yet spatially
separated positive and negative charges). If thousands or millions of roughly parallel
neurons receive the same input simultaneously, an array of dipoles, each occurring based
on the distribution of charges along a neuron, is created. This results in what might
be termed an average or macro-dipole, a so-called equivalent current dipole (ECD). Such
dipoles and the resultant ECDs are particularly likely to occur in pyramidal cells, aligned
almost parallel and placed in a perpendicular fashion to the surface of the cortex. On
the scalp, located parallel to the majority of the gyri of the cortex, ECDs are measured
as voltage fluctuations in the EEG and, based thereupon, the ERP. As the conduction
of voltages through brain, skull, and scalp occurs at only slightly less than the speed of
light, the ERP tracks ECD-based neural signals almost in real-time.
Whether the polarity of an EEG or ERP signal is indicative of a certain class of neural
operations is subject to debate. One reason why negativities and positivities in the EEG
might indeed reflect two distinct neurophysiological processes is that the polarity of EEG
recordings depends on where the synaptic transmission responsible for the dipoles and
ECD occurred (Elbert & Rockstroh, 1987). Depolarization of the postsynaptic mem-
brane close to the skull elicits negativity in skull-surface measurements, as the negative
pole of the dipole is above the positive pole. Depolarization farther from the surface
(i.e., deeper within the cerebral tissue) leads to positivity in the EEG, as the area where
the postsynaptic potentials occur, leading to a regional negativity, is below the opposing
inactive end of the neuron where the relative positivity of the dipole develops. Crucially,
the location of subcortical afferents might be related to the functional role of their signals.
Synaptic input at the distant, apical dendrites of cortical pyramidal neurons presumably
increases the excitability of these neurons, whereas proximal synapses close to the so-
mae of these neurons usually facilitate a decrease in their overall excitability (Elbert &
Rockstroh, 1987). Thus, negative EEG signals, based on postsynaptic potentials close to
the skull, could indicate excitatory processes (i.e., an increase in neural activity in the
generator regions), whereas positive EEG signals, based on activity near the somae of cor-
tical neurons, should indicate the inhibition of activity in pyramidal neuron assemblies.
It should be noted, however, that this view has become secondary to a more detailed
understanding of ERP components that is based on an extant literature allowing us to
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assign specific psychological processes to a certain ERP signature, almost irrespective of
the nature of the precise cellular mechanisms of its emergence (see Amodio et al., 2013;
Fabiani et al., 2000; Luck, 2005).
3.1.2 ERP Components
3.1.2.1 General Features
An ERP is usually assessed and depicted relative to the onset of the event that induces the
fluctuations of cortical dipoles. Its appearance is characterized by a series of systematic
deflections (components) with a certain polarity (negative vs. positive) and latency (i.e.,
the point in time, relative to the event, at which the deflection peaks). All key parameters
of the ERP and its components are relative, not absolute values. First, an ERP generally
depicts the difference between activity measured at a certain site and a reference site;
a typical point of reference is the averaged signal at both mastoid processes, where the
same degree of unsystematic noise as at scalp electrodes, yet only very little actual neural
activity is measured (Luck, 2005). Second, the voltage of the ERP (e.g., the amplitude of
a given component) always refers to the change in voltage relative to a predefined baseline
phase. Often, a short period preceding the event is used to assess the baseline level of
activity (e.g., 100 ms before the onset of a stimulus). Third, the polarity of a component
refers to its voltage relative to preceding components: If the overall ERP shifts and all
voltages are negative, a deflection in the positive direction is usually interpreted as a
positivity, even if its voltage is not actually above zero.
The labels assigned to ERP components are often based on their polarity and latency. As
summarized by Fabiani and colleagues (2000), though, there are various other habits of
labelling, such as applying an ordinal number for a deflection of a certain polarity (e.g.,
N1, P2, P3), describing the functional origin of a component (e.g., mismatch negativity,
novelty-P3) or naming its approximate location (such as P2a or frontal P3). Notably, the
labels of many components are not used consistently, such that minor (e.g., P3 vs. P300)
or even major (e.g., P2a vs. P3f vs. FP vs. FSP) discrepancies occur (for examples, see
Bloom, Potts, Evans, & Drobes, 2013; Potts, 2004; Potts, Martin, Burton, & Montague,
2006; Sutton & Ruchkin, 1984).
In many depictions and discussions of ERPs, researchers also take the spatial distribution
of components across the scalp into consideration. This topography often has a bearing on
the interpretation of ERP findings, since many components have a typical or standard fo-
cus. For example, the face-related N170 (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996)
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is usually observed to be more strongly pronounced at right-hemispheric lateral posterior
sites than at the analogous left-side electrodes (see, e.g., Eimer, 2000; Itier & Taylor,
2004; Rossion & Jacques, 2008). Moreover, some components that appear very similar
according to their main features (polarity and latency) can be distinguished as separate,
potentially independent signatures on the basis of their topographies (Luck, 2005). For
example, the well-known P3 refers to at least two functionally different components, one
of which has a posterior maximum, while the other one peaks at frontocentral electrodes
(Polich, 2007; Polich & Criado, 2006; see also Sutton & Ruchkin, 1984). Finally, topog-
raphy is often reported for ERP effects, rather than or in addition to the components
themselves. This way, one can determine the scalp position at which an experimental ma-
nipulation, or whichever independent variable is currently considered, exerted its maximal
influence (for an example, see Gibbons, Bachmann, & Stahl, 2014). It should be noted,
however, that the assessment of scalp topography does not provide sufficient information
as to the actual neural sources of surface discharges (Luck, 2005). Due to the inverse
problem, the generators of a component need not necessarily lie in proximity to its scalp-
topographical peak. For some components, such as for the N170, the source is indeed
close to the location of the surface peak (Deffke et al., 2007; Latinus & Taylor, 2006).
For other components, such as the auditory N1 component, there is a notable distance
between cerebral sources and ERP peak location (Giard et al., 1994; Jääskeläinen et al.,
2004).
3.1.2.2 Quantification
ERP components are typically quantified for all recording sites, for pre-selected electrodes
that are known to depict a certain component most clearly and directly, or for clusters of
electrodes. Of course, quantification is done separately for different experimental condi-
tions, such that ERP components can be compared between these conditions. To quantify
a component, three different major strategies are most frequently used. First, one can
compute the mean amplitude in an appropriate time range in which the component of
interest is observed (Amodio et al., 2013). This time range is sometimes determined a pri-
ori based upon previous research or, perhaps more often, chosen to fit the characteristics
of a component, as assessed by visual inspection of the ERP averaged across participants
(Amodio et al., 2013). For example, if a component peaks early and features a brief as-
cent and steep descent in amplitude, a somewhat narrow frame would be chosen (e.g., 30
ms around the early visual P1). Later, slower, and broader components of the ERP are
usually assessed by means of averaging amplitudes in wider time windows (e.g., 200 ms
around a late, parietal P3). This general approach of time-window amplitude averaging is
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used most frequently (Amodio et al., 2013) and preferred by some authors on theoretical
grounds (Luck, 2005).
Second, one can assess the peak amplitude of a component, which refers to the maximum
voltage in case of positivities and the minimum voltage for negativities. This is usually
done automatically by means of a computer algorithm that extracts the peak voltage
of a certain polarity in a certain time range, separately for different channels in each
participant (Amodio et al., 2013). For example, to quantify the peak of the previously
mentioned N170, one might determine the most negative amplitude within a range of 150-
210 ms after the onset of a face (Ofan, Rubin, & Amodio, 2011). In the case of the N170,
one might additionally restrict the search for negative peaks to lateral posterior electrodes
(Ratner & Amodio, 2013). Sometimes, researchers use not only the amplitude value at
the specific sampling point where the component peaks, but rather the mean amplitude
at a certain number of sampling points around the peak (e.g., ±5 points). Note that
a component’s mean amplitude around its peak is based on the specific latency of this
component at a given electrode in an individual participant. In the standard amplitude-
averaging approach (as described above), an appropriate time window is determined and
fixed for all participants, without consideration of interindividual variations in component
latency.
Third, one can quantify a component by focusing on its latency (Amodio et al., 2013).
To this end, the abovementioned peak-detection procedure is used, yet one assesses the
interval between the onset of the event and the peak of a component. A typical application
of this method is when the focus of an analysis is on the speed, rather than on the intensity,
of neural operations (see, e.g., Eimer, 1998). Often, analyses of latency are conducted to
ascertain that variations of (peak) amplitude are indeed modulations of amplitude, rather
than side effects of latency differences between conditions.
3.1.2.3 Classification and Application
Many researchers discriminate between different classes of components. A common ap-
proach is to make a distinction between early (sensory or perceptual), mid-latency (cog-
nitive, often classification-related), and late (higher cognitive) components of the ERP
(Fabiani et al., 2000). According to Luck (2005), the most relevant components include
C1, P1, N1, N170, P2, N2, P3, N400, error-related negativity (ERN), and the lateralized
readiness potential (LRP). Several of these components, as well as additional ones not
listed here, will be essential in understanding the work on the neurocognition of social
influence that has been published so far, including my own contributions. However, I will
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not provide an extensive and comprehensive overview of all these ERP components since
this would go well beyond the scope of the present thesis. Instead, each relevant compo-
nent will briefly be introduced in the context of social-influence research in the upcoming
main chapter. For additional details, I refer the reader to eminent reviews and volumes
in this field (e.g., Amodio et al., 2013; Bartholow & Amodio, 2009; Fabiani et al., 2000;
Kok, 1997; Luck, 2005; Luck & Kappenman, 2011; Rugg & Coles, 1995).
As noted earlier, there is a solid body of research on the functional significance of many
ERP components, such that specific hypotheses about psychologically induced variations
of their amplitude, latency, and topography can be derived a priori. Much of the previous
research on common components was based on general experimental investigations that
have isolated the driving forces behind a component fairly well (for various examples,
see Luck & Kappenman, 2011). This is why ERPs are no longer restricted to investiga-
tions into fundamental cognitive functions, but can also be used to study more complex
psychological issues. For many components, their basic determinants and their potential
“meaning” under various circumstances have been established by now (Amodio et al.,
2013). Therefore, one can apply this knowledge to gain valuable insight into the cog-
nitive processes that are at the heart of sociopsychological phenomena (Amodio, 2010a;
Bartholow & Amodio, 2009).
3.2 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)
A relevant portion of previous studies on the neurocognition of social influence have used
fMRI (e.g., Berns, Capra, Moore, & Noussair, 2010; Berns et al., 2005; Deuker et al., 2013;
Edelson, Sharot, Dolan, & Dudai, 2011; Izuma, 2013; Klucharev et al., 2009; Klucharev
et al., 2011; Stallen, Smidts, & Sanfey, 2013). It is one of the most frequently employed
techniques in cognitive neuroscience and at the center of a heated debate regarding the
promises and pitfalls of neuroimaging in psychological research (Diener, 2010; Vul, Harris,
Winkielman, & Pashler, 2009). The method is based on MRI, which is the assessment of
body structure based on different magnetic responses in different types of tissue (Logo-
thetis, 2002).
As roughly summarized by Ashby (2015), MR machines produce a strong, static magnetic
field, and a special coil emits radiofrequency pulses to elicit an in-phase precession of
protons, usually in hydrogen molecules, in the tissue that is being scanned. Upon the
offset of the pulses, the protons return to their previous alignment induced by the static
magnetic field, which triggers the release of energy that is measured by the coil as the
“raw MR signal” (Ashby, 2015, p. 94). Crucially, different types of tissue (e.g., bone, gray
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matter, or tumors) have quite different densities, which differentially affects the proton
relaxation. Therefore, the speed of the relaxation is somewhat characteristic of a certain
tissue. By additionally applying three varying gradients of magnetic radiation along the
three dimensions, one can attribute a specific relaxation signal registered outside the body
to a specific location within (Ashby, 2015).
While MRI is a static assessment of tissue, similar to a photography or an x-ray image,
albeit in 3D, the time dimension is added in fMRI. Specifically, MR images of the brain are
repeatedly taken to estimate the flow of blood as a proxy for cerebral activation (Harris,
Reynell, & Attwell, 2011). The crucial parameter is the blood-oxygenation level dependent
(BOLD) signal (Logothetis, 2002). The oxygen carrier in our blood, hemoglobin, has
different magnetic properties depending on whether it does or does not carry oxygen
molecules (Pauling & Coryell, 1936), which affects the abovementioned MR signal. If
an area in the brain is activated, the consumption of oxygen increases, which is met by
an enhanced flow of oxygenated blood toward this region. Therefore, after an initial dip
in the level of available oxygen due to the elevated regional demand, the proportion of
oxygenated relative to deoxygenated blood increases close to an activated area of the
brain, which triggers a positive BOLD signal (Harris et al., 2011; Logothetis, 2002).
Although the association between what is supposed to be measured (brain activity) and
what actually accounts for the measurement (blood-oxygenation level) appears somewhat
oblique, the BOLD signal closely and reliably reflects regional fluctuations of local field
potentials in nervous tissue (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann, 2001).
The spatial resolution of fMRI is very high, especially compared to other techniques
that aim to image functional properties of the brain (Amodio et al., 2013). A notable
shortcoming of this method, however, is its temporal precision. The speed at which
repeated images of the brain are taken is severely limited. Moreover, changes in the
BOLD signal are inert, taking several seconds to peak and decaying even more slowly
(Ashby, 2015). As this does not match the actual speed of many electrophysiological
signals in the brain, fMRI offers only a poor account of the unfolding of neural processes
over time (Luck, 2005).
4 The Neurocognition of Social Influence
What is the neural foundation of social influence? I can forestall at this point that this
question will not be answered in the present thesis—just as it is not answered in the cur-
rent literature on this matter. Such a question is as tempting as it is presumptuous. In
fact, it is an example of the false hopes or scientific hubris that might arise from recent ad-
vances in our technological means (Diener, 2010; Vul et al., 2009). Cognitive neuroscience
is neither equipped nor inclined to uncover the neural correlate of a complex, macro-level
process such as social influence. Rather, an appropriate neurocognitive perspective on
psychological processes—especially the broader, more complex ones—is to deal in smaller,
more circumscribed units. Particularly in social neuroscience, the quintessential approach
is to disassemble complex social behavior into its cognitive ingredients (for similar discus-
sions, see Abe, 2011; Amodio, 2010a; Bartholow, 2010). Accordingly, we have begun to
unravel small and confined, yet essential mechanisms of the human cognitive system that
play crucial roles in the overall process of other people’s influence on ourselves (for an
overview of these studies, see Publication I ; Falk, Way, & Jasinska, 2012; Izuma, 2013;
Mojzisch & Krug, 2008; Stallen & Sanfey, 2015).
In many recent studies, the involvement of certain fundamental cognitive functions in
social influence has been substantiated by studying their neurophysiological signatures.
Scholars have gathered convincing evidence that the higher-level process of social influ-
ence involves modulations of lower-level processes such as perception, attention, value
coding, and reward expectation. It should be noted early on, however, that the contri-
bution of these mechanisms largely depends on the psychological scenario—as emulated
by choosing certain parameters and experimental constraints—that is being studied. For
example, while some of the research has dealt with the actual processing of group norms,
other studies have focused on the consequences of knowing a group norm during one’s sub-
sequent assessment of the current object of judgment. Such choices of focus are strongly
affected by the neurocognitive perspective on the larger issue at hand, and the diver-
gent results should be considered complementary rather than contradictory, with their
prevalence depending mostly on the specific situational demands and constraints.
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Before I elaborate on previous and very recent investigations into the neurocognition of
social influence, common conceptual and experimental approaches should be clarified.
First, all studies have used mock social sources of influence. That is, whenever I mention
that averaged group responses, norms, or other people’s judgments were presented in
other scholars’ or my own experimental investigations, these social cues are fully experi-
mentally manipulated. Consequently, they do not represent the actual judgments of true
participants. Second, two different settings have repeatedly been used to induce norm-
based influence and measure conformal adjustment in naïve participants (see also Toelch
& Dolan, 2015). In what might be termed the one-shot paradigm of social influence,
participants learned about a social norm and were then confronted with the to-be-judged
stimulus to which the previously presented norm pertained (Berns et al., 2005; Germar,
Albrecht, Voss, & Mojzisch, 2016; Germar et al., 2014; Trautmann-Lengsfeld & Her-
rmann, 2013, 2014). Thus, only one single judgment, presumably varying as a function of
the preceding norm, is given. In what we could call the two-shot paradigm, participants
gave their judgment on a certain item and received, usually immediately after their own
response, information regarding the norm. In an unannounced follow-up-rating session,
all items were rated once more, this time without any feedback as to the norm (Chen, Wu,
Tong, Guan, & Zhou, 2012; Kim et al., 2012; Klucharev et al., 2009; Klucharev et al.,
2011; Nook & Zaki, 2015; Shestakova et al., 2013; Zaki, Schirmer, & Mitchell, 2011).
Thus, each item was rated exactly twice, with the norm being conveyed between the
ratings. The actual task that participants performed varied across studies; however, in
most studies employing the one-shot paradigm, objective perceptual decisions were made,
while most experiments based on the two-shot paradigm involved subjective, evaluative
decisions (for an extensive discussion and an overview of previous studies, see Publication
I ). Interestingly, the distinction between different tasks might be less relevant than the
differentiation of the one-shot and two-shot designs. As noted above and as will be ex-
plained in detail in the sections to come, the choice of paradigm largely determines one’s
focus of analysis, which in turn limits one’s range of potential discovery.
As noted earlier, our current knowledge on the neurocognitive mechanisms of social in-
fluence is based almost entirely on research into the effects of group norms on individual
behavior (i.e., conformity as per the definition presented earlier), although a few addi-
tional studies have investigated related social phenomana, such as persuasion (see, e.g.,
Falk, Berkman, Mann, Harrison, & Lieberman, 2010; Falk et al., 2015; Klucharev, Smidts,
& Fernández, 2008). Given the differentiability of varying forms of social influence, as
advocated by renowned scholars in social psychology (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Wood,
2000), it seems prudent to focus on the type of scenario and psychological process ex-
plicitly addressed in the vast majority of studies and in my own line of research (for a
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related discussion of this distinction, see Publication I ). Therefore, most of the following
will emphasize social influence induced by group norms.
4.1 Modified Representations of To-Be-Judged Features
In Publication I, a comprehensive review of the literature published before 2014, we have
carved out a fascinating similarity of several seemingly unrelated studies: There is evi-
dence that social influence involves the modulation of the individual’s own representation
of the currently to-be-judged feature. This idea derives from experiments in which the
influence of a previously presented norm on subsequent processing was assessed (one-shot
paradigm). Specifically, several researchers asked participants to judge a stimulus as to
a certain quality and presented the majority’s response directly before the to-be-judged
item was processed (Berns et al., 2005; Germar et al., 2016; Germar et al., 2014; Koban
& Wager, 2016; Trautmann-Lengsfeld & Herrmann, 2013, 2014). First and foremost, all
of these studies demonstrated the pervasive influence of social norms by showing that
individual responses were aligned to the preceding majority judgment. Additionally, the
studies neatly converge in finding evidence of systematic changes in the basic mental rep-
resentation of the to-be-judged feature, which is particularly noteworthy given the fact
that vastly different scenarios, tasks, and measurements were used.
4.1.1 Previous Findings
Berns and colleagues (2005) asked participants to perform a mental rotation task while
being scanned in an MRI machine. Participants saw two images of geometric shapes
and had to indicate by button press whether the two images depicted the same shape,
with one having been rotated differently than the other, or two different shapes. In two
thirds of all trials, four small pictures on the side of the screen indicated—before the
pair of to-be-judged images appeared—whether four ostensible other participants had
unanimously judged the upcoming shapes as identical or different. In a control condition,
which was administered as a separate block before or after the social condition (with the
order counterbalanced across participants), the judgments of a computer were ostensibly
presented instead of the mock group’s responses. Participants were significantly more
likely to follow the incorrect judgments of the group (41%) than those of the computer
(32%). The main focus of the fMRI analysis was on the processing of the to-be-judged
shapes, during which BOLD responses were recorded as a proxy for regional brain activity.
Berns and colleagues assessed neural activity during the processing of shapes to which
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participants subsequently responded incorrectly by following the group or the computer.
Crucially, they compared trials in which participants incorrectly conformed to the group
with trials in which they incorrectly aligned their response to a computer. The main
finding was that activity in the baseline network associated with the mental-rotation task,
particularly in the visual cortex, was larger during adjustment to the group as compared
to adjustment to a computer. According to the authors, this indicates that the group
norm affected participants’ actual perceptual analysis of the to-be-judged objects.
Trautmann-Lengsfeld and Herrmann (2013, 2014) later challenged the interpretation fa-
vored by Berns and colleagues (2005). They argued that the poor temporal resolution
of fMRI does not allow us to ascertain that activity modulations in cortical sensory net-
works indeed reflect changes during early stages of visual perception. Instead, it might
indicate a modulation of later, reentrant processes in visual areas (Trautmann-Lengsfeld
& Herrmann, 2013). To address this issue, they ran a similar experiment, but analyzed
ERPs instead (Trautmann-Lengsfeld & Herrmann, 2013, 2014). Participants viewed two
neighboring random-dot patterns and indicated which of the two contained more dots.
Again, the stimuli were preceded by ostensible group judgments. The most striking find-
ing was that the early visual brain potential P1, an index of perceptual processing in
visual cortices (Martínez et al., 1999), was attenuated when participants agreed with an
incorrect group opinion as compared to when they agreed with a correct group response
(Trautmann-Lengsfeld & Herrmann, 2013). The authors interpreted this finding as more
compelling evidence that social influence affects early perceptual processing, rather than
late reentry processes based on feedback signals from higher cortical structures. Although
these findings are not entirely conclusive on their own, including a possible confound with
spatial cueing (for an extended discussion, see Publication I ), Trautmann-Lengsfeld and
Herrmann’s (2013) claims fit well with Berns et al.’s (2005) proposition. Moreover, the
findings were partially replicated in a subsequent study (Trautmann-Lengsfeld & Her-
rmann, 2014), in which both the tendency to conform and the abovementioned attenua-
tion of the posterior P1 were stronger for participants scoring low (as compared to high)
on a survey measuring trait autonomy.
The notion that perceptual processing can be influenced by social norms recently received
support from a study employing methods of computational modeling. Germar and col-
leagues (2014) used a diffusion-model analysis to estimate the contribution of different
cognitive processes to overt binary decisions, which is done by taking a person’s responses
and the distribution of their timing into account. The basic rationale is that a decision
process can be understood as a stochastic diffusion of accumulated evidence between two
boundaries that represent the two possible responses (Ratcliff, 1978). A decision is reached
whenever the threshold of a specific response has been overcome (Voss, Rothermund, &
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Brandtstädter, 2008). When a stimulus is processed and evidence in favor of either one
of the two responses is gathered, a diffusion process determined both by a systematic
and a random component is initiated (Germar et al., 2014). Two of the parameters that
determine the speed and output of this diffusion are the relative starting point and the
drift rate. The starting point refers to the potential level of bias in favor of one of the two
responses, with the diffusion process already beginning closer to one threshold (i.e., re-
sponse) than the other. The drift rate indicates the speed at which sensory information in
support of a certain response is gathered. A large drift rate signifies a strong and system-
atic diffusion toward a certain response, which is typically observed when the to-be-judged
feature of a stimulus is particularly obvious (Voss, Nagler, & Lerche, 2013).
In two experiments, Germar and colleagues (2014) asked participants to indicate whether
a dichromatic pattern contained more blue or orange dots, learning about the judgments
of a mock group of fellow participants immediately before each pattern. Participants were
much more likely to give a certain response if the group had previously given this specific
response. Crucially, this was not a mere priming or anchor effect caused by the previ-
ous occurrence of a certain response, as the adjustment effect was significantly smaller
in a control condition in which the group’s responses were seemingly irrelevant. Impor-
tantly, Germar and colleagues estimated diffusion-model parameters for each participant
and condition, and they found that the overt behavioral social-influence effect was best
explained by a modulation of the drift rate, while the relative starting point appeared
unaffected by the group’s judgments. Having learned that the group had given a certain
response, participants subsequently accumulated evidence in favor of this specific response
more strongly and quickly than when the group had given the opposing response. This
indicates that the uptake of sensory information was directly modulated by the previously
observed group norm. Norms thus appear to profoundly bias perceptual processes rather
than inducing only a generalized bias to produce a given response (Germar et al., 2014).
This notion was replicated only recently in a similar paradigm (Germar et al., 2016).
Interestingly, a very recent study on pain perception provided additional support for the
assumption that social influence goes beyond the level of overt responding. Koban and
Wager (2016) demonstrated that previously presented information on how others osten-
sibly rated the intensity of a painful stimulus affected not only participants’ ratings as
to how painful the stimulus was: Autonomic responses to pain stimuli, measured in an
objective way by recording skin conductance responses, were systematically modulated
by what a prior norm indicated regarding the painfulness of these stimuli. The effect of
pain-related norms on pain evaluation and on autonomic responses was mediated by par-
ticipants’ explicitly stated expectations that developed based on the purported norms.
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Zaki and colleagues (Zaki et al., 2011) demonstrated effects of social norms on fundamental
internal representations during highly subjective, evaluative judgments. Note that they
used the previously mentioned two-shot paradigm of social influence. However, they
did not focus on the processing of the norms themselves, but rather on how the to-
be-rated items were processed when they were shown for a second time. Participants
rated the attractiveness of faces and learned, after each rating, how an ostensible group
had purportedly rated this face on average. Slightly later, participants unexpectedly
rated all faces once more, yet brain activity was now monitored using fMRI and no
group judgments were shown. Faces that had been rated more favorably by the group
than by the individual elicited stronger BOLD responses in the ventral striatum and
in orbitofrontal cortex than faces that had been rated less favorably by the group than
by the individual. Crucially, both areas are known to code the subjective value that
one assigns to an item (see, e.g., Berns, McClure, Pagnoni, & Montague, 2001; Schultz,
2000, 2002). This finding was replicated within the same sample that underwent the
social-influence paradigm by running an additional control task that allowed the authors
to localize brain activity induced by non-social, monetary reward (Zaki et al., 2011).
These results indicate that social influence directly shapes the neural representation of
value, obviously causing a systematic alignment of decision-relevant features to match
a group’s valuation (Zaki et al., 2011). This finding is at odds with a study in which
no modulation of activity in brain networks associated with subjective valuation was
observed when adolescents learned about their peers’ preferences (Berns et al., 2010).
Other studies do, however, support the notion proposed by Zaki and colleagues (2011) by
showing that norms conveying other people’s attitudes indeed modify activity in one of
the central value-related neural hubs, the ventral striatum, during one’s assessment of to-
be-judged items (Campbell-Meiklejohn, Bach, Roepstorff, Dolan, & Frith, 2010; Mason,
Dyer, & Norton, 2009; Sherman, Payton, Hernandez, Greenfield, & Dapretto, 2016; see
also Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2012).
Finally, there is evidence that norms pertaining to our memories can actually alter our
own memories. In a study by Edelson and colleagues (Edelson et al., 2011), partici-
pants watched a video and were asked several questions regarding the video a few days
later. Crucially, they could observe how ostensible other participants responded to these
questions. The real participants strongly aligned their responses to those of others, mak-
ing substantially more errors when others incorrectly remembered details from the video
than when they did not. The authors assessed BOLD responses during the perception
of group norms (i.e., the purported memories of the unanimous majority). Crucially,
they compared neural activity for norms leading to persistent conformal memories (i.e,
false memories that were still in line with the incorrect group norm a week after it was
perceived) with neural activity underlying the processing of norms that entailed only
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temporary conformal memories (i.e., those that were correctly reported a week after the
incorrect norm was perceived). Amygdala activity and amygdala-hippocampus connec-
tivity during the processing of group norms was notably stronger for norms that resulted
in persistent memory conformity as compared to those leading only to temporary false
memories. According to the authors, the involvement of hippocampal regions and the
amygdala, which projects heavily to the hippocampus, indicates that social influence can
truly alter the neural representation of memory (but see Deuker et al., 2013).
4.1.2 Novel Contributions
My own work in this line of research comprises one theoretical and one empirical contri-
bution. First, I have integrated several findings on the neurophysiological and cognitive
principles of social influence (Publication I ), from which I have derived the proposition
that social norms can systematically shift the mental representation of to-be-judged fea-
tures. Second, in a straightforward ERP study, I have extended this basic notion and
combined it with a different theoretical perspective that focuses on the general mode of
cognitive processing (Publication II ).
4.1.2.1 A Comprehensive Account
Clearly, the studies recapped above are quite diverse regarding their methods (fMRI,
EEG, computational modeling, and peripheral physiological recordings) and paradigms
(objective perceptual judgments, pain judgments, subjective evaluative ratings, memory
task). Nevertheless, they share, at a somewhat abstract level, one basic notion: Social
influence appears to be capable of directly shaping fundamental internal representations
(Publication I ). Obviously, the specific correlate of internal processes that is affected is
vastly different between studies. This apparent discrepancy is easily resolved by taking
a closer look at the varying objectives of participants in the different studies. It seems
highly likely that the specific type of information (or feature) that is at the heart of
one’s current judgment is affected by social norms. During perceptual decisions, the
representation of perceptual information is modulated by social norms (Berns et al., 2005;
Germar et al., 2016; Germar et al., 2014; Trautmann-Lengsfeld & Herrmann, 2013, 2014);
one’s physiological response to pain is altered by currently available social norms on pain
(Koban & Wager, 2016); norms regarding an item’s valuation affect how we represent its
value (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Mason et al., 2009; Zaki et al., 2011); norms on
what others purportedly remember from the past shape our own formation of memory
(Edelson et al., 2011).
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The applicability of this mechanism is somewhat limited. It is restricted to situations
in which we have gained knowledge of a social norm before we process a to-be-judged
stimulus and make our own judgment. Often, however, we are already very familiar
with an item when we encounter a norm regarding this item, such that we might be
more inclined to compare the norm and our own assessment, instead of assessing the
item in light of the norm. Moreover, the conditions and moderators of this type of
mechanism have yet to be clarified. For example, based on previous studies, we can only
assert that norm-induced modulations of relevant representations can occur when norm
and judgment relate to the same issue: During perceptual judgments, a norm regarding
perceptual features can alter perceptual processing in the individual. What is unclear,
though, is whether norms can exert the same fundamental influence if they refer to a
feature that is currently not at the heart of the individual’s judgment. What influence
does a norm regarding perceptual features of an item exert if one currently does not
engage in a perceptual task, but rather subjectively evaluates the item? More refined
manipulations are needed to disentangle whether the type of feature referred to by the
norm (e.g., perceptual, evaluative, mnemonic) fully determines the type of modulation
of subsequent representations, even if the norm does not pertain to the same specific
feature upon which the individual rests his or her current judgment. Although this is
highly speculative, it is conceivable that for a norm to exert a profound influence on
mental representations, the subject of the norm has to be the subject of the individual’s
judgments as well, thus putting the norm at the center of the individual’s attention.
The notion that social norms have such a fundamental influence calls for a more in-depth
understanding of how this works at the neural level. In Publication I, we have proposed
that knowledge of a norm creates a specific expectation, which alters and directs basic
encoding processes in a top-down fashion (Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 2003; Shuler &
Bear, 2006; Summerfield & Egner, 2009). Expectations could elicit a neural template, such
as a certain pattern of preparatory activation of the very neuron populations that code for
the feature in question. When the actual to-be-judged stimulus is processed, the response
of these neurons is a function of the actual information generated by the external stimulus
itself and the expectation-induced activation template previously induced by the norm.
One might also describe this process as a norm-based bias in the representation of the
critical, norm-related stimulus feature, which is in keeping with recent interpretations of
socially influenced perceptual processing (Germar et al., 2016; Germar et al., 2014). This
notion is compatible with contemporary models of the general computational principles of
the human brain which encompass the idea that the encoding of basic external information
involves a constant, expectation-based backflow of information from higher-level neuron
assemblies (Friston, 2005; Rao & Ballard, 1999). Thus, the representation of an actual
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sensory event is a reconciliation of external (bottom-up) and internal (top-down) signals
(Summerfield & Egner, 2009).
The general idea that expectations mediate the influence of social norms on the repre-
sentation of the currently to-be-judged feature (as briefly laid out in Publication I ) has
recently received empirical support (Koban & Wager, 2016): Norm-induced modulations
of pain perception and peripheral physiological responses to pain were fully mediated by
the explicit expectations triggered by the norms. It should be noted that such expecta-
tions are clearly not always as conscious and nameable as in the pain-perception study
by Koban and Wager (2016). Models of expectation-based top-down comparisons in per-
ceptual processes do not necessarily assume that people actually become aware of these
expectations (Summerfield & Egner, 2009). Rather, these are highly automatized pre-
dictions of the neural apparatus that need not be reflexible. This is not so say, however,
that they cannot become aware to the individual, such as when participants are explicitly
asked which expectations social norms elicit (Koban & Wager, 2016). Nevertheless, the
specifics of the general mechanism, as roughly proposed above, are still vague and highly
speculative. Targeted manipulations and analyses are needed to substantiate this sugges-
tion. What seems safe to state, however, is that social influence can indeed shape basic
mental operations. Note that this assertion echoes some of the classical theories on social
influence. As explained in detail earlier, various theorists have proposed that socially
adjusted behavior can be the consequence of conversion, which denotes a true adoption
of other people’s judgments (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Kelman, 1961; Moscovici et al.,
1969). The mechanism of descriptive social norms directly tampering with the individ-
ual’s mental representation of what is currently being judged might be the neurocognitive
correspondent of the assumed process of conversion (Zaki et al., 2011).
4.1.2.2 The Role of the Depth of Processing
The notion that one crucial locus of the influence of social norms is the representation of
the to-be-judged information itself is not entirely novel. The neurocognitive perspective
involves a precise assessment of separate stages of processing (see, e.g., Germar et al.,
2014) and the intensity of neural responses (see, e.g., Trautmann-Lengsfeld & Herrmann,
2013). Established sociopsychological theories have not resolved social influence to this
level of cognitive detail. Nevertheless, some of them already consider the representation
of judgment-relevant information, including the to-be-judged stimulus, quintessential in
the process. Specifically, it has been proposed that one’s current cognitive mode and,
consequently, the quality of one’s representation of judgment-relevant information is pre-
dictive of the tendency to adjust one’s views or judgments (Axsom et al., 1987; Chaiken,
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1980; Chen et al., 1996). According to the heuristic-systematic model of information
processing (Chaiken, 1980), there are two fundamentally different modes of processing: a
quick, heuristic and a systematic, elaborate mode. We tend to rely on heuristics—simple
short-cut rules—whenever we choose or need to apply little cognitive effort during our
decisions (Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 1999). Rather than dissecting information in-
tently and intensively, we stick to a simple, over-learned rule that represents our best
guess at behaving appropriately without investing too much time and energy (see also
Petty & Cacioppo, 1996). Crucially, social norms are the basis of two commonly used
heuristics (Chen et al., 1996; see also Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Wood, 2000). When our
primary motive is to be accepted by the group, we know that we can achieve this some-
what effortlessly by openly complying (“go along to get along”). When our primary goal
is to be accurate and precise in our judgments, yet our resources are currently limited, we
know that the majority’s judgments tend to be correct, such that the adoption of majority
views seems promising (“consensus implies correctness”). Therefore, heuristic processing
should involve an increased tendency to adjust one’s own judgment to the majority’s,
almost irrespective of one’s current primary motive.
Cognitive styles are widely assumed to be directly linked to a person’s current mood, with
negative mood inducing a tendency to process information systematically, while positive
mood fosters a heuristic mode (see, e.g., Bless et al., 1996; Bodenhausen, Kramer, &
Süsser, 1994; Mackie & Worth, 1989). Fittingly, the tendency to conform to social norms
varies as a function of mood: People in a positive mood rely more heavily on the judgments
of others as compared to those in a negative mood (Tong, Tan, Latheef, Selamat, & Tan,
2008). Although participants’ mood was experimentally manipulated in the study by
Tong and colleagues (2008), their finding provides only indirect evidence of a link between
cognitive style and conformity. There was no reliable assessment of the actual style of
processing, which was only assumed to be in a certain state due to participants’ mood.
In Publication II, we aimed to complement the findings of Tong and colleagues (2008)
by providing the missing link between processing style and conformity. Our simple and
straightforward idea was that the depth of one’s analysis of a to-be-judged stimulus should
be related to the degree of one’s adjustment to group norms. We reasoned that individu-
als currently or dispositionally employing an effortless, heuristic strategy should be more
inclined to adopt the group’s responses than individuals who process judgment-relevant
information more elaborately. To assess the depth of encoding of to-be-judged informa-
tion, we used ERPs and chose faces as the target stimuli. The perceptual analysis of
faces in the human brain is characterized by a highly specialized, distinct component:
the N170, a negativity peaking around 170 ms at lateral posterior electrodes. Its neural
generators are assumed to include the posterior fusiform gyrus and lateral occipitotempo-
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ral cortex (Deffke et al., 2007; Schweinberger, Pickering, Jentzsch, Burton, & Kaufmann,
2002). There is widespread consensus that it is a precise neural signature of the structural
and configural encoding of faces (e.g., Bentin et al., 1996; Eimer, 1998, 2011). That is,
it reflects an advanced encoding of faces as a whole, rather than a stepwise detection of
salient features or subcomponents (Eimer, 2000). Previous work has shown that N170
amplitude is sensitive to motivational variations and, most importantly, is a reliable in-
dicator of the general strength of face encoding (Amodio et al., 2013; Eimer, 2011; Ofan
et al., 2011; Ratner & Amodio, 2013; Schmid & Amodio, 2016).
We asked participants to rate the attractiveness of a series of somewhat ambiguous virtual
faces on a 6-point scale. Crucially, participants saw the ostensible average judgment of
previous participants before each face. First, we demonstrated that participants signifi-
cantly aligned their judgments to the purported norms. We were able to ascertain that
participants did not simply adjust their ratings to the numerals indicating the group’s
judgments (in the sense of a simple priming effect), as no evidence of adjustment what-
soever was found when the numerals were not labeled as averaged group judgments. As
part of our main analysis, we then assessed, for each participant, their individual propen-
sity to conform and their average intensity of face-specific encoding. To this end, we
first performed a linear regression analysis for each individual, predicting attractiveness
ratings based on preceding group norms. For each participant, the slope of this regres-
sion (i.e., the increase of individual ratings with increasing group judgment) was used
as a conformity score. Subsequently, we measured the mean amplitude of individual
N170 peaks at parieto-occipital electrodes PO7 and PO8 during the observation of the
to-be-evaluated faces, averaged across a total of 200 trials. In line with previous research
(see, e.g., Ofan, Rubin, & Amodio, 2014), the facial N170 was more strongly pronounced
at right-hemispheric sensors, such that we subsequently focused on electrode site PO8.
However, one might argue that this need not be the case for all participants, which might
become an issue when performing across-participant correlations. We therefore repeated
all main analyses reported below after determining the laterality of the N170 individually
for all participants, which yielded the exact same pattern of results.
Confirming our expectations, N170 amplitude was robustly related to conformity scores
across participants (Spearman’s ρ = .48). Note that the N170 is a negativity, such that
the positive correlation indicates that a high level of conformity is associated with a low
level of N170 amplitude. One might argue that this relation merely indicates that both
face processing and conformity are related to a common third variable, such as a central
personality feature. To test this idea, we analyzed whether the correlation would hold
even if we partialled out the contribution of major personality characteristics (such as
extraversion, neuroticism, openness, conscientiousness, agreeableness, or trait anxiety).
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Confirming our initial findings, we found that the relation was still reliably observed even
when these personality scores were controlled for.
The findings of Publication II support the claim of Tong and colleagues (2008) that con-
formal adjustment to a group is related to a person’s mode of processing. The more
superficially a person encodes the to-be-judged stimuli, the more likely he or she is to
adopt group norms regarding these items. Clearly, our study is correlational, prohibiting
causal inference. Yet our findings can and should be interpreted in the context of previous
studies in which the style of processing was indirectly manipulated and no actual measure
of the strength of stimulus encoding was available. The use of ERPs allowed us to fill this
empirical gap and support previous behavioral data and theories regarding the role of
cognitive processing in socially adjusted behavior (Axsom et al., 1987; Chen et al., 1999;
Chen et al., 1996; Tong et al., 2008). Moreover, I propose that this association is equally
likely a part of both commonly reported motives that drive conformal behavior. First, if
participants had only an inadequate representation of the to-be-judged stimuli or could
not bring themselves to attend to them closely, they still might have wanted to achieve
at least a certain level of accuracy in their judgments. Based on their knowledge that the
group is often a valid source of information, they could have resorted to its norms, which
would constitute informational social influence driven by an accuracy motive. Second,
participants who were inclined to adjust their judgments to the group anyway might not
have been motivated to process the to-be-judged faces at all or might have even tried to
dampen the input evoked by the faces. The latter would have allowed them to avoid “cog-
nitive dissonance” (Festinger, 1962) that would arise from following others even if their
judgments were sometimes openly erroneous. Assuming that the motive of a generalized
tendency to conform to the group, irrespective of its accuracy, is to avoid negative social
sanctions, this would suggest that normative social influence, driven by an affiliation goal,
was the motivational foundation of the observed relation. To summarize both accounts,
it seems possible that superficial encoding of the virtual faces might have necessitated
conformity (informational influence) or a superordinate inclination to conform (norma-
tive influence) might have provoked or even necessitated superficial processing. Either
way, our data corroborate the notion that social influence is robustly associated with the
style of processing. Specifically, we emphasize the role of the depth of encoding of the
object of one’s judgment.
In light of our proposal that the mental representation of to-be-judged information is a
pivotal locus of social influence (Publication I ), the findings of Publication II, in combina-
tion with complementary behavioral research, can be seen as an affirmation and extension
of our theorizing. First, it underlines the idea that social influence does not only work
via a late, decision-related correction of one’s response, but rather relies on modifications
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of early, basic representations during the decision-making process. Second, it adds the
notion that it is not only specific norms (such as “this face is popular” or “this pattern
is mostly orange”) that directly modulate basic representations. The overall thorough-
ness of the formation of representations likewise contributes to our conforming to social
norms.
Interestingly, Germar and colleagues (2014) reported that participants processed to-be-
judged visual patterns more carefully when they were under the impression that they
saw relevant, as compared to irrelevant, group judgments. Only recently, they replicated
this finding and provided additional support using ERPs (Germar et al., 2016). At first
glance, this might appear to be at odds with the above claims that social influence is
associated with superficial processing of to-be-judged information. Both findings are,
however, indeed compatible. Importantly, the results presented by Germar and colleagues
(Germar et al., 2016; Germar et al., 2014) are not entirely surprising, as they could
constitute an instance of the well-known phenomenon of social facilitation (see, e.g.,
Bond & Titus, 1983; Harkins, 1987). Situations in which potentially valuable social
information is available might elicit a general enhancement of the individual’s vigilance
or motivation to excel at a task, perhaps triggered by an increased “generalized drive”
(Zajonc, 1965). Therefore, comparing a decision-making scenario in an expressly social
situation with a less socially relevant situation (as done in Germar et al., 2016; Germar
et al., 2014) should reveal enhanced stimulus processing in the former as compared to
the latter. What we did in Publication II, however, was to specifically focus only on
participants who were all uniformly exposed to social influence. Even if being exposed to
others deepens one’s analysis, one might still find that—within a population uniformly
exposed to social influence—those who process the to-be-judged items more superficially
tend to rely on group norms particularly heavily (Tong et al., 2008). As proposed by
Germar and colleagues (2016), the overall depth of one’s assessment of the to-be-judged
item could have a moderating effect on other mechanisms, such as biased perceptual
analysis, that actually cause social conformity.
4.2 Social Proof and Deviance as Behavioral Outcomes
To understand the neural and cognitive foundations of social influence, it seems prudent
to explore how knowledge of a norm alters the way in which we process the objects of
our judgments. Another perspective, however, is to put special emphasis on the moment
of one’s perception of the norm itself. Crucially, as noted earlier, it stands to reason
that we often develop an attitude toward a to-be-judged issue before we are confronted
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with the norm. Perceiving a social norm, then, should usually instigate a process of
comparison. In fact, it has been proposed that our assessment of other people’s judgments
against the backdrop of our own is a central aspect of social interaction and a major
determinant of social influence (Cialdini et al., 1999; Festinger, 1954). This is in keeping
with the general assertion that humans tend to process their environment relatively or
comparatively (Kahneman & Miller, 1986).
At this point, it might be helpful to establish a certain terminology that will recur in most
of the studies reported hereafter. When a person makes a judgment, or already holds
an attitude toward a given issue, and this person is then confronted with how others
have judged the same issue, the assumed process of comparison can yield two results:
The group’s judgment can be consistent with or different from the individual’s. Various
denominations of the two outcomes of this comparison are conceivable and, fittingly, they
are not labeled consistently throughout the literature. Some refer to them simply as social
conflict versus no social conflict (Klucharev et al., 2009), but one might also call them
social (in)congruency, (dis)agreement, or (mis)match. It should be noted that all of these
terms are used interchangeably in the present context. Mostly, however, I prefer to label
the two potential comparison results as social proof and deviance.
Not much surprisingly, a substantial share of the literature regarding the neurocognition
of social influence has investigated how individuals assess and evaluate group norms in
relation to their own judgments. Although they have used different labels, these studies
have basically examined how social proof and deviance are represented in the human
brain. Initiated by an innovative fMRI study (Klucharev et al., 2009), various scholars
have tried to characterize the neural processes engaged in determining these two relevant
social outcomes and to find out how such processes relate to subsequent behavior and
cognitions. This line of research has led to the proposition that neural circuits generally
involved in reinforcement learning play a key role in social influence (see Izuma, 2013):
Norms appear to trigger the differentiation of social proof and deviance, which is afforded
by neural structures that typically code behavioral outcomes.
Our behavior in response to a given stimulus is largely determined by the outcome of this
behavior, that is, how pleasurable or painful the consequences of this specific response to
this specific stimulus are (Thorndike, 1911). Based on previous reward or punishment,
many animals learn how to behave upon the occurrence of a certain stimulus or event
(Thorndike, 1927). Although this idea might seem self-evident from a present-day per-
spective, it was fiercely contested upon its original publication (see Thorndike, 1933).
The concept of learning based upon reinforcement has evolved to a significant degree over
time, extending its scope and application both within psychology and well beyond (see,
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e.g., Frank, Seeberger, & O’Reilly, 2004; Kober & Peters, 2012; Moore & Atkeson, 1993;
Sandholm & Crites, 1996). One core aspect of previous and contemporary research has
been to disentangle the neural networks and mechanisms underlying reinforcement learn-
ing (for a recent review, see Lee, Seo, & Jung, 2012). Midbrain dopaminergic neurons
have been identified as the key, albeit not the only, structures that represent the value
of reinforcers (i.e., stimuli perceived as rewarding or punishing) and cues promising the
later receipt of reinforcers (for an overview, see Schultz, 2010). Perhaps the most relevant
contribution comes from neurons in the substantia nigra and the ventral tegmental area
as well as from neurons in forebrain areas, some of which—such as the basal ganglia and
frontal cortical structures—receive projections from the midbrain dopaminergic neurons
(Schultz, 2000). In the below summary of previous findings, some of the reward-sensitive
forebrain areas will be of particular interest, as they appear to code not only typical rein-
forcers, such as food or money, but even more complex ones, such as (dis)agreement with
social norms.
The neural representation of behavioral outcomes is usually not absolute, but rather rel-
ative (Schultz, 2010). Specifically, we process reward and punishment relative to our cur-
rent expectation of what the outcome will be—although it should be noted that these are
not necessarily conscious expectations on which the individual actively reflects, but often
implicit, computationally derived predictions based on the system’s previous experience.
The notion that outcomes are processed in relation to one’s predictions is quite logical
or even necessary, seeing as outcomes have a remarkable potency to induce substantial
changes in behavior (Thorndike, 1911). That is, they represent an effective source of learn-
ing, in which the comparison of actual and predicted events generally plays a crucial role:
Learning, the change in the strength of an association between two units (e.g., between
two events or between an action and an outcome), advances as a function of the degree
of unpredictability of one unit from the other (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Schultz, 2006).
In instrumental learning (i.e., learning driven by reinforcement or the lack thereof), this
means that our association between a certain action and an outcome grows more quickly if
the actual outcome differs much from the predicted outcome than if predicted and actual
outcome are hardly different or even identical. Therefore, a crucial parameter that affects
the strengthening of an action-outcome association is the reward prediction error : the de-
gree of deviation of an outcome expectation from the actual outcome. Therefore, it seems
consistent and, in a way, economical that the human brain generally processes reward
relative to a prediction based on previous reward and punishment (Schultz & Dickinson,
2000). The midbrain dopaminergic system—with its connections to basal and cortical
structures of the forebrain, including the ventral striatum and the cingulate cortex—is
assumed to provide the neural basis of the representation of prediction errors during the
assessment of behavioral outcomes (Schultz, 1997, 2002). Dopamine neurons bidirection-
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ally code both positive prediction errors (i.e., an outcome is better than predicted) and
negative prediction errors (i.e., an outcome is worse than predicted) via activation and
depression, respectively (Schultz, 2007).
4.2.1 Previous Findings
Klucharev and colleagues (Klucharev et al., 2009) asked participants to rate a series
of faces as to their attractiveness. After each response, participants saw the ostensible
average rating of participants who had purportedly completed the same task previously. A
small number additionally indicated the degree of deviation of the participant’s judgment
from the ostensible group’s (0, ±2, ±3). Participants did not encounter the group at
any point or were made to feel pressured to belong. Rather, the norm was merely a
depiction of the typical behavior of the group; that is, participants were confronted with
a descriptive social norm (Klucharev et al., 2009). In an unannounced reassessment
session, participants were later asked to evaluate all faces for a second time. As expected,
a substantial adjustment of individual ratings was observed. Faces initially rated less
positively by the individual than by the group were evaluated significantly more favorably
during the second as compared to the first assessment. Likewise, participants lowered
their ratings of faces that they had previously rated more favorably than the group. Only
faces on which the individual agreed with the norm were rated similarly during the first
and second assessment. The authors concluded that a strong tendency to conform was
evident. Whenever social deviance was detected, ratings were adjusted in the direction
of the norm. The main focus of analysis was, however, on the moment when participants
were confronted with the group norm, which should trigger perceptions of social proof or
deviance.
When participants observed a mismatch, as compared to a match, between their own and
the group’s judgment, activity in the anterior cingulate cortex increased, while activity
in the nucleus accumbens, located in the ventral striatum within the basal forebrain,
decreased (Klucharev et al., 2009). This effect was robust and much stronger when
ostensible group norms were presented than when computer-generated judgments were
purportedly shown. Moreover, activity increases in the anterior cingulate in response to
mismatches positively predicted participants’ subsequent tendency to adjust their ratings
toward the norm. The pattern of activity modulations in the anterior cingulate cortex
and nucleus accumbens suggests that social proof and deviance are represented similarly
(or, at least, by the same neural networks) as reinforcement in general (Klucharev et al.,
2009). A vast body of research has implicated the anterior cingulate in the processing
of negative feedback and punishment (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd & Coles,
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2002). Likewise, there is ample evidence of the involvement of the nucleus accumbens in
reward coding (Berns et al., 2001; McClure, Berns, & Montague, 2003).
In the study of Klucharev and colleagues (2009), the pattern of activity indicated the
involvement of typical neural responses to reinforcers, from which the authors concluded
that behaving in line with social norms is perceived as rewarding, while deviating from it
is treated as an error or punishment. Although it is well established that such behavioral
outcomes are represented according to their deviation from an internal reward prediction
(Schultz & Dickinson, 2000), which Klucharev et al. (2009) explicitly acknowledged, they
did not clarify the exact nature of prediction-error coding in their experiments. There
was no suitable control condition, without feedback or with a neutral outcome, and situ-
ations of agreement between norm and individual judgment were directly compared with
those of disagreement. Therefore, it remains unclear whether (a) social proof elicited a
positive prediction-error signal, or (b) social deviance led to a negative prediction-error
signal, or (c) both prediction errors occurred. Nevertheless, the findings of Klucharev and
colleagues (2009) conclusively indicate the involvement of neural hubs that are known to
code behavioral outcomes and contribute to reinforcement learning (Izuma, 2013). This is
supported by data showing (a) that a gene assumed to affect dopaminergic neurotransmis-
sion is significantly associated with the likelihood of conforming to the group, and (b) that
perceiving a majority’s judgment deviate from one’s own correct assessment is associated
with increased activity in the anterior cingulate (Deuker et al., 2013). By downregulating
activity in the posterior medial frontal cortex, which includes the anterior cingulate, via
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), the causal involvement of this area was demon-
strated (Klucharev et al., 2011): Participants whose posterior medial frontal cortex was
suppressed were significantly less likely to adjust their judgments toward the group’s than
participants with sham or no stimulation.
Moreover, ERPs were used in order to test whether social proof and deviance differentially
affected a well-known correlate of outcome processing. As mentioned earlier, the FN is
deemed a reliable neurophysiological signature of the assessment of behavioral outcomes
(see, e.g., Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Miltner et al., 1997). It should be noted that
various different conventions regarding the terminology of the FN and related components
exist. Loosely based on a recent study (Publication IV ), the following differentiation and
nomenclature seem appropriate: When participants observe the outcome of an action, a
relative negativity, often superimposed upon a broader drift of the ERP in the positive
direction, is often observed for both negative and positive feedback around 250 ms (see,
e.g., Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Kreussel et al., 2012; Pfabigan, Alexopoulos, Bauer,
Lamm, & Sailer, 2011). There is some variation as to the shape of the deflections, as
a peak in the negative direction is not consistently observed for positive feedback (see,
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e.g., Baker & Holroyd, 2011; Holroyd, Hajcak, & Larsen, 2006; Miltner et al., 1997). The
component elicited by negative feedback is often referred to as the FN (or FRN), while
the component induced by positive feedback is the reward positivity (Rew-P; Baker &
Holroyd, 2011). When the ERP for positive feedback is subtracted from that for negative,
the resultant difference curve reveals a negativity around 250 ms that denotes the FND,
the difference between the raw FN and the raw Rew-P (for a similar terminology, see
Publication IV ).
Several recent studies using various different tasks consistently report an FND during the
processing of social norms following individual judgment, based on a larger relative nega-
tivity during the detection of one’s deviance from the norm compared to one’s agreement
with it (Chen, Wu, et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2012; Kimura & Katayama, 2013; Kimura
et al., 2013; Shestakova et al., 2013; Yu & Sun, 2013). As the FN is associated with
the processing of negative feedback, loss, and punishment (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002;
Holroyd & Coles, 2002), while the Rew-P is triggered by positive feedback, reward, and
gains (Baker & Holroyd, 2011; Holroyd, Krigolson, & Lee, 2011), this strongly supports
the findings from fMRI and TMS studies (Klucharev et al., 2009; Klucharev et al., 2011).
As explained above, it appears that group norms are instantaneously evaluated as to their
rewarding or punishing character, based on whether or not they are in accordance with
one’s own judgment. This suggests that reinforcement learning, fed by outcome-triggered
evaluative signals, is at the heart of our adjustment to norms (for an extended discussion,
see Publication I ). Additional research has further extended this view by demonstrating
that the source of a descriptive norm is a crucial moderator of the neurocognitive processes
underlying our evaluation of social norms (Izuma & Adolphs, 2013). As this exceeds the
scope of the present synopsis, the interested reader is referred to recent reviews (Falk
et al., 2012; Izuma, 2013; Stallen & Sanfey, 2015).
4.2.2 Novel Contributions
Previous work on the contribution of outcome assessment to social influence is perva-
sive and conclusive. Nevertheless, it merely represents a starting point from which to
explore the specifics of this mechanism. In fact, even today, seven years after Klucharev
and colleagues (2009) first suggested the involvement of brain functions associated with
the processing of behavioral outcomes and, thus, with reinforcement learning in social
influence, there is much to be clarified about the assumed process. My colleagues and I
have filled empirical gaps regarding fundamental methodological issues (Publications III,
IV, V ) and extended our knowledge of the process itself (Publications VI, VII, VIII ).
Importantly, the key presupposition in this series of studies is the idea that our capability
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to determine the value of our actions, which is the quintessential premise of reinforcement
learning, largely determines our mental representation of social norms.
4.2.2.1 Correctly Assessing Deviance-Induced Conformity
In recent years, a frequently used measure of conformity was the degree of the correction
of one’s judgment as a function of the level and direction of (dis)agreement with the
social norm, as assessed in the typical reinforcement-learning paradigm of social influence
(Klucharev et al., 2009). Participants typically rate an item, receive information about
the group norm, and later rate all items once more. The change of each item’s evaluation
(second minus initial assessment) is used as dependent variable, while the deviation of
the norm from individual judgment is the critical independent variable (norm is below
the individual’s judgment; norm is equivalent to the individual’s judgment; norm is above
the individual’s judgment). Downward changes for images initially rated more favorably
by the individual than by the group (norm-lower condition) and upward corrections for
images initially rated less favorably by the individual than by the group (norm-higher
condition) are consistently reported in this paradigm. Unfortunately, this setup entails an
unwanted confound (Yu & Chen, 2015): The norm can only be lower than the participant’s
own judgment whenever the latter was sufficiently high. Likewise, the norm can only
exceed a participant’s judgment if the latter was sufficiently low. To put it differently,
initial judgments that are already somewhat low cannot be met by lower norms; also,
high initial judgments cannot be met by higher norms. Thus, certain deviations are
tied to a certain extremity of the initial response. At first glance, this might appear
irrelevant, as it is a natural consequence of our use of finite scales in experiments and,
presumably, of our actual mental representation of evaluations. It is, however, a problem if
we consider a well-known natural consequence of the extremity of judgments. If we assess
a scalar measurement twice, initially extreme judgments tend to lie closer—regress—to
the mean of the distribution during their second assessment (Blomqvist, 1987; Cutter,
1976; Pezdek & Eddy, 2001; Stigler, 1997; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). If we look
at judgments followed by lower group norms, we observe a downward correction of the
second assessment, which we interpret as the direct consequence of the deviation from
the intervening norm. However, since the initial judgments followed by lower norms were
actually somewhat high themselves, it is likely that their decrease was not, or not solely,
an effect of the intervening norm’s deviation, but an instance of natural regression toward
the mean (RTM). Likewise, we consider upward corrections an effect of the intervening
norms that lie above participants’ initial judgments. Again, however, it is possible that
the sheer lowness of those specific judgments that were followed by higher norms actually
triggered the correction in the upward direction, which is both the direction of the norm
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and of the mean of the rating distribution. Therefore, behavioral measures of deviance-
induced conformity are bound to be thoroughly imprecise. They could reflect actual
conformity and RTM, or they might simply represent RTM effects that were completely
misinterpreted as effects of norms and their deviation from individual judgment.
Yu and Chen (2015) replicated the procedure of Klucharev and colleagues (2009), yet
controlled for the influence of RTM by removing the contribution of the level of initial
ratings. Note that, as explained above, the level of an initial rating is associated both
with a certain tendency to regress and with a certain norm deviation that can follow the
initial rating. This unwanted confound of deviation and RTM prevents us from knowing
whether behavioral adjustment is caused by deviation, the confounded RTM, or both. Yu
and Chen (2015) tested two different strategies to control for the level of initial ratings:
(a) selecting only a subset of items for analysis to match the mean level of initial ratings
followed by norms deviating in different directions; and (b) including the level of initial
judgments as a covariate in a regression analysis. Both strategies caused the previously
observed effect of deviation between norm and individual judgment on rating changes to
vanish completely. It should be noted, however, that it would be premature to dismiss
previous work on the grounds of this study and to conclude that the deviance-based
paradigm does not induce conformity. Most importantly, Yu and Chen (2015) ran only
13 participants, which forbids us to interpret null effects at all. Moreover, completely
purging the influence of initial ratings on rating change seems overly drastic. Conformity
might vary as a function of the extremity of one’s own initial judgment; for example, if
one attends more closely to social norms when they concern items on which one has taken
a firm stance and chosen a somewhat extreme judgment. Therefore, the contribution of
initial ratings should not be eliminated, but rather corrected for only to the degree to
which they actually inflate the assessment of conformity.
In Publication III, we addressed the issue of RTM in deviance-induced conformity for
two reasons. First, we wanted to reassess whether the typical paradigm indeed yields
no true conformity effect whatsoever. Second, we aimed to devise a novel, more precise
correction procedure. To tackle both enterprises, we used what is typically assumed to be
the best approach to control for RTM (Barnett, 2004; Yu & Chen, 2015): a straightforward
control-group design. In addition to an experimental group that performed the basic task
previously described, we ran a control group of participants who did the exact same
experiment except for one important detail: They did not see any group norm after each
initial judgment. We did, however, program the experimental protocol in a way that
allowed us to register for each trial which group norm would have been presented in this
moment—if this were the experimental group. That is, after each participant judgment,
a norm that could theoretically be presented following this judgment was drawn, yet not
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shown. Subsequently, we analyzed for both groups whether the level of deviation between
individual judgment and group norm affected participants’ rating changes. As expected,
we observed a very strong effect in the experimental group: Items in the norm-lower
condition had a negative change score (indicating downward corrections), while items in
the norm-higher condition had a positive change score (indicating upward corrections).
For items on which norm and individual agreed, change scores close to zero were observed.
This finding neatly replicates various previous findings (e.g., Kim et al., 2012; Klucharev
et al., 2009; Klucharev et al., 2011; Shestakova et al., 2013).
Interestingly, however, we observed a very similar effect of norm deviation on rating
changes in the control group. This is particularly striking given that the control group
did not receive any information regarding these group norms whatsoever. Nevertheless, we
found a significant effect of this invisible pseudo-factor when analyzing rating change as a
function of the norms that would have been, yet were not actually, presented. This clearly
demonstrates that rating changes, which would have been attributed to the intervening
norms if we had not implemented the control group ourselves, occur even in the complete
absence of social norms. This reflects the influence of RTM (see also Yu & Chen, 2015).
Crucially, the pseudo-effect in the control group was significantly smaller than the effect in
the experimental group, which indicates that more than RTM contributed to behavioral
adjustment when participants actually observed group judgments. The observed rating
changes in the experimental group were most likely compounds, comprising both true
conformity effects and RTM.
Finally, we used a hierarchical linear model to extract from the control group an algorithm
allowing us to predict for each participant in the experimental group the level of RTM
that was to be expected for a given item. Specifically, we analyzed for all items (level 1)
in all participants (level 2) of the control group how rating change, which is only the
consequence of RTM, can be predicted based on the level of an initial rating. This gave
us a simple algorithm that allowed us to estimate for a given initial rating how much
RTM would have to be expected in a follow-up rating. We applied this algorithm to each
item in each participant of the experimental group and subtracted the resultant estimate
of to-be-expected RTM from the observed rating change. The result of this subtraction
should be an appropriate estimate of the true conformal adjustment behind the observed
compound rating change for each item. Finally, we used these corrected rating changes,
the putative estimates of true conformity, as dependent variable and repeated the analyses
described earlier. As expected, a significant effect of norm deviation on corrected rating
changes was observed, supporting our notion that a true conformity effect exists in this
paradigm (see also Huang, Kendrick, & Yu, 2014; Nook & Zaki, 2015; Zaki et al., 2011). In
the control group, our correction for RTM completely eliminated the previously observed
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pseudo-effect of the nonexistent variable norm deviation, supporting our idea that this
effect was completely carried by RTM.
In Publication III, we thus strongly corroborated the previous claim that behavioral ef-
fects observed in paradigms assessing deviance-induced conformity contained an unwanted
contribution of regression toward the mean. We did, however, demonstrate that RTM
causes an inflation of the true conformity effect, yet does not cause the observed effect
in its entirety. Finally, we proposed a novel correction procedure to effectively, yet care-
fully and selectively remove the contribution of RTM from one’s measure of behavioral
adjustment. One crucial benefit of our approach is that the correction is performed on
the lowest level of analysis (the to-be-judged items), thus allowing an early cleaning of
measurements. This enables us to use cleaned values not only during group-level analyses,
but already during the determination of individual behavioral scores. This is particularly
important as across-participant correlations of conformity scores and external variables
are often used in this line of research, for example, when neuroimaging or genetic data are
available (Falk et al., 2012). Therefore, clean and valid individual measures of conformity
are necessary.
4.2.2.2 The Functional Significance of the FND
As expressed earlier, ERP studies on social influence have mostly focused on the repre-
sentation of social proof and deviance as behavioral outcomes. Specifically, the FND has
been assessed and discussed in considerable detail (Chen, Wu, et al., 2012; Kim et al.,
2012; Shestakova et al., 2013). Based on the finding of an FND for social deviance relative
to social proof, it has been concluded that group norms that are at odds with one’s own
previous assessment are represented very much like negative feedback, loss, or punishment
(Kim et al., 2012). What has mostly been neglected in this line of research, however, is
that the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the FND in general have been sub-
ject to debate in recent years. It is prudent to carefully examine and experimentally test
the functional significance of this component to better understand its principles. This,
then, should feed into our interpretation of the FND caused by social norms, which can
then further inform our understanding of the reinforcement-learning mechanisms of social
influence.
The seminal finding that subtracting the electrophysiological response to positive feedback
from that to negative feedback yields an enhanced negativity around 250 ms (i.e., the
FND) has typically been interpreted as a sign of enhanced activity in the anterior cingulate
cortex during the assessment of negative outcomes (Miltner et al., 1997). Triggered
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by input from midbrain dopaminergic neurons, the anterior cingulate cortex might be
disinhibited and signalize that outcomes are worse than expected (i.e., negative prediction
errors), which is critical information in reinforcement learning (Holroyd & Coles, 2002).
The FND would thus rely on signals of the need for adjustment from the anterior cingulate
(Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). A slightly different theoretical
account likewise suggests that the anterior cingulate is at the heart of this component,
but it assumes that it signals prediction errors in general, irrespective of whether the
outcome is better or worse than anticipated (Alexander & Brown, 2011). More recently,
the somewhat advanced discussion of the neural generators of the FND has given way to
a slightly more basic concern with how the FND actually comes about, which is crucial in
interpreting its functional significance. This is a matter of debate as the FND is derived
from a difference wave, rather than being an actual component itself (Miltner et al., 1997).
Therefore, multiple explanations of the occurrence of a relative negativity are conceivable.
Moreover, as explained earlier, ERP deflections often reflect the summation of various
overlapping neural responses, sometimes even differing in polarity. Consequently, it is
occasionally hard to discern the origins of variations of actual components, let alone
difference waves (Luck, 2005).
Recent studies have questioned the basic idea that an enhanced response to negative feed-
back elicits the FND. Several findings indicate that a stronger response to positive than to
negative feedback causes the observed difference (e.g., Baker & Holroyd, 2011; Eppinger,
Kray, Mock, & Mecklinger, 2008; Foti, Weinberg, Dien, & Hajcak, 2011; Kreussel et al.,
2012; Kujawa, Smith, Luhmann, & Hajcak, 2013). Positive, but not negative, outcomes
might trigger a positivity (Rew-P), presumably originating in the basal ganglia (Foti et
al., 2011). This has, however, long gone unnoticed because researchers often assessed dif-
ference waves rather than raw components: Subtracting the response to positive feedback
from that to negative feedback, one observes a negativity in the FN time range, which is
erroneously interpreted as a sign of an increased negativity caused by negative feedback
(Miltner et al., 1997). However, even if one does look at the raw components elicited
by positive and negative feedback separately, one might be inclined to assume that the
effect is driven by the negative condition. Sometimes, albeit not always, during feedback
processing, a strong negativity (N2) that is not directly associated with the valence of
the feedback occurs almost simultaneously with the feedback-driven components (Baker
& Holroyd, 2011). As a consequence of this concurrence of components, even the raw
Rew-P triggered by positive feedback is not always visible as a positive component, but
only attenuates the N2 (Holroyd et al., 2011). What is actually an increased positivity to
positive feedback (Rew-P) can thus easily be perceived as a weaker negativity. Crucially,
no reward response in the basal ganglia is triggered by negative outcomes. Therefore,
there should be no Rew-P and, thus, no notable attenuation of the simultaneous N2. If
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one visually compares the components during positive and negative feedback in the FND
time range, one gets the impression that negative outcomes elicit a stronger negativity
than positive outcomes—even though this presumably actually reflects a reduced nega-
tivity for positive feedback, caused by the underlying Rew-P (Baker & Holroyd, 2011).
This alternative electrophysiological explanation of the occurrence of the FND would have
implications for our understanding of the psychological mechanisms of outcome assess-
ment: The key driver of the well-known electrophysiological differentiation of negative
and positive feedback might be our response to positive outcomes.
Another limitation of our knowledge on the FND concerns potential situational mod-
erators. A close look at the literature reveals that an FND is usually reported when
unambiguous, easily discriminable feedback was presented (e.g., plus and minus signs).
Clearly, learning under every-day conditions does not rely on only one type of feedback
per outcome valence, but rather comprises a wide array of options. For example, we
can affirm someone’s behavior with an almost endless number of phrases of praise (e.g.,
yes, good, perfect, correct, right, that’s it, absolutely) and reprehension (e.g., no, wrong,
incorrect, fault, not at all). Likewise, social feedback can arise from various different sig-
nals such as several potential facial expressions of affirmation and disapproval (Pfabigan,
Alexopoulos, Bauer, & Sailer, 2011; Zhang, Li, Qian, & Zhou, 2012). Interestingly, when
slightly more variable, rather than binary, feedback was presented in previous studies,
the FND was found to be severely diminished (Liu & Gehring, 2009; Liu, Nelson, Bernat,
& Gehring, 2014; Mars, de Bruijn, Hulstijn, Miltner, & Coles, 2004; Pfabigan, Zeiler,
Lamm, & Sailer, 2014).
In Publication IV, we directly addressed both of the above concerns. Most importantly,
we tested whether the ambiguity of feedback signals affected ERP responses. We argued
that the neural encoding of feedback should be fundamentally different if the exemplars
representing the feedback are completely unambiguous than if the determination of their
meaning requires more effort. If the same two words repeatedly occur (e.g., yes vs. no),
minimal perceptual cues, such as the first letter or the rough shape of the word, should
suffice to access the outcome value of the word, that is, whether it represents positive
or negative feedback. The same type of quick extraction of feedback valence should not
occur for feedback delivered by a more variable array of exemplars. To test this idea, we
asked participants in Experiment 1 to deduce the ostensible, but actually nonexistent rule
behind the visual feedback they received for pressing either of two buttons in response
to colored digits or letters. As we were only interested in neural signatures of feedback
processing, not of successful learning, there was no actual rule and, hence, no contingency
between responses and feedback. Crucially, feedback was either presented in a blocked
fashion (with one word for each feedback valence being used in several consecutive trials)
The Neurocognition of Social Influence 51
or in a randomized order (such that feedback was drawn at random from five different
feedback words per valence). We found no FND whatsoever for ambiguous feedback,
that is, for feedback for which the specific exemplar of the valence category was drawn
randomly and thus less predictable. This suggests that an easy discrimination of feedback
stimuli is necessary to elicit an FND.
Perhaps most importantly for the present thesis, the design of Experiment 1 in Publication
IV additionally allowed us to assess whether the selective occurrence of an FND in the
blocked, but not in the random, condition was due to an increased negativity for negative
feedback (Miltner et al., 1997) or an enhanced positivity for positive feedback (Eppinger
et al., 2008). We found clear evidence that the latter was the case, with a marked Rew-P
for blocked positive feedback standing out from all other conditions, obviously causing
the FND. We thus strongly support the assumption that the differentiation of feedback
in the FND time range relies on an increased reward response rather than on an error
signal (Foti et al., 2011), which might tentatively be called a positivity bias in feedback
processing.
Two additional results in Publication IV should be discussed. First, we found that the
frontocentral P2, often interpreted as an index of top-down attentional selection (Anllo-
Vento, Luck, & Hillyard, 1998; Carretié, Hinojosa, Martín-Loeches, Mercado, & Tapia,
2004; Potts, Patel, & Azzam, 2004), was markedly enhanced for negative feedback in the
random, but not the blocked condition. We propose that this reflects a bias to detect
negative feedback under conditions of ambiguous outcomes. Previous evidence suggests
that uncertainty triggers the anticipation of negative events (Sarinopoulos et al., 2010) and
preferential processing of negative information (Xu et al., 2011). This is in keeping with
the notion that the familiarity and safety of our environment determine whether we exhibit
general tendencies toward approach or avoidance behavior (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990).
Fittingly, we conceptually replicated this idea in Experiment 2, in which we monitored
neural activity during the processing of valence in general, that is, not restricted to
feedback processing. When participants performed a speeded classification of affective
words, we again observed an increased frontocentral P2 for negative as compared to
positive stimuli, but only in a highly variable, ambiguous context, not in an unambiguous
setting.
Another remarkable finding in Publication IV was that the LPC, a distinct, sustained
positivity presumably reflecting controlled, motivated attention (Hajcak, Dunning, &
Foti, 2009; Weinberg & Hajcak, 2011; Zhang et al., 2013), was not affected by feedback
ambiguity. It thus appears to be a robust and consistent index of outcome evaluation,
irrespective of variations in basic encoding processes of the exemplars representing the
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feedback. Interestingly, the LPC was larger for negative than for positive feedback, which
is in line with some reports on feedback-induced LPC modulations (Frank, Woroch, &
Curran, 2005; West, Bailey, Anderson, & Kieffaber, 2014; West, Bailey, Tiernan, Boon-
suk, & Gilbert, 2012), yet at odds with others (e.g., Pfabigan, Alexopoulos, Bauer, Lamm,
& Sailer, 2011; Pfabigan et al., 2014). Although this is tentative and clearly speculative,
one might explain this divergence with different foci during the assignments in different
studies. Whenever participants are—inadvertently or on purpose—prompted to use their
mistakes as the primary source of information during learning, the LPC might be en-
hanced for negative feedback. Whenever the detection of correct responses is emphasized,
this should lead to an enhanced LPC for positive feedback.
Our main conclusion based on Publication IV is that specific context factors, such as
the ambiguity of feedback, can strongly affect how we process outcomes. Our general
focus or attention toward signals of a certain valence shifts as a function of the variability
of current feedback information. Moreover, the most well-established ERP signature of
feedback processing, the FND, appears to primarily reflect how neural structures coding
for reward, but not those that represent punishment, differentially respond to positive
and negative feedback. All of these conclusions have serious implications not only for our
understanding of outcome processing in dedicated and controlled learning tasks such as
the one used in Publication IV, but also for the interpretation of reinforcement learning
in a social context. Norms appear to be appraised much like simpler types of outcome
information, which evidently serves as a neural representation of the social correctness
of our own behavior. To fully grasp and recognize this process, however, an advanced
understanding of the basic principles of feedback processing underlying reinforcement
learning is necessary. Publication IV serves this exact purpose as it allows us to apprehend
other scholars’ and our own studies on reinforcement mechanisms of social influence more
adequately.
4.2.2.3 The Functional Significance of the LPC
As explained above, the most robust ERP signature of feedback processing in Publication
IV turned out to be the LPC, which was sensitive to the valence of feedback irrespective
of the current context. Notably, both positive and negative feedback have been reported
to lead to an enhancement of the LPC in previous studies (see, e.g., Pfabigan et al., 2014;
West et al., 2014), suggesting that it does not code outcome valence (Yeung & Sanfey,
2004). To understand its functional significance, it has turned out to be particularly
instructive to consider studies investigating affective and social processes. For example,
both positive and negative words, as compared to neutral ones, elicit an enhanced LPC
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(Schacht & Sommer, 2009). Likewise, the LPC is very similar for pleasant and unpleasant
images, while it is larger for both than for neutral ones (Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley,
Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000; Schupp et al., 2000). Attractive faces lead to larger LPC
amplitudes than unattractive ones (Johnston & Oliver-Rodriguez, 1997; Zhang & Deng,
2012). Stimuli providing information regarding another person’s behavior in a social-
dilemma game have been found to elicit a larger LPC than socially non-informative cues
(Bell et al., 2015). Also, explicit prejudice against out-group members is associated with
an increased LPC during the processing of out-group, as compared to in-group, faces (Ito,
2004). All of the above findings can be reconciled by assuming that the LPC is sensitive
to the motivational significance of stimuli (Weinberg & Hajcak, 2011). It appears to
reflect sustained attentional prioritization and an enhanced perceptual analysis of relevant
sensory input (Schacht & Sommer, 2009). This is in keeping with the neural source of
the LPC in the context of affective processing, which comprises a network of cortical
areas related to attentional processes, such as the ventrolateral prefrontal and cingulate
cortex, as well as subcortical structures associated with affective processing, such as the
amygdala (see Liu et al., 2012).
Publication V supports the above notion regarding the functional significance of the LPC
based on a study on social perception. By presenting images of nonverbal displays whose
social relevance to the observer should vary and measuring LPC amplitude as the de-
pendent variable, we provided novel data that might elucidate whether the component
indeed serves as a reliable indicator of attentional orienting reflecting the social motiva-
tional significance of a stimulus (Weinberg & Hajcak, 2011). The starting point of our
investigation was the assumption that our capacity to process and interpret nonverbal ex-
pressions has evolved to favor the perception and analysis of ecologically relevant displays
over less significant ones (see, e.g., Zebrowitz & Collins, 1997). In keeping with this idea,
it has been theorized that displays of supremacy and dominance are particularly relevant
cues that are readily detected as part of an adaptive strategy of person perception (Furley
& Schweizer, 2015; Rule, Adams, Ambady, & Freeman, 2012; Tracy, Shariff, & Cheng,
2010). The potency of this essential human faculty can be demonstrated quite strikingly
in the context of sports. Even naïve observers are able to accurately estimate sports
scores on the basis of thin slices of behavior (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992), that is, using
minimal perceptual cues such as brief video clips of intermissions during sports competi-
tions (Furley & Schweizer, 2014). This capability relies on observers’ quick and accurate
perception of dominance during the examination of athletes (Furley & Schweizer, 2015).
Following this logic, we applied ERPs—for the first time in this specific context—and
asked participants in the experimental study reported in Publication V to estimate the
current score based on black-and-white images of athletes presented for 500 ms. These
images depicted athletes during game intermissions and did not involve any explicit signs
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of victory or loss, such as raised arms, covered faces, or tears. The athletes shown in
the images were currently either in the lead, in a draw, or trailing. Based on ecological
theories of person perception, it stands to reason that the most motivationally relevant
images should be those associated with dominance and supremacy (Furley & Schweizer,
2015), that is, the images of athletes currently leading. Assuming that the LPC tracks the
degree of attentional prioritization of relevant information (Weinberg & Hajcak, 2011),
its amplitude should be largest for images showing athletes currently leading, especially
as compared to those who were currently trailing.
First, we replicated previous findings that amateur observers are indeed able to roughly
estimate the score of a sports competition based on thin-slice images of athletes (Furley
& Schweizer, 2014). Although participants in our study did not reliably differentiate the
score for athletes in a draw and for leading ones, they were clearly able to discriminate
the score in images from these two categories from the score in images displaying athletes
who were currently trailing. Most importantly, however, our ERP hypothesis was neatly
confirmed, as we did not only observe the typical posterior LPC during the observation
of the to-be-evaluated images, but also a linear increase with increasing score in favor
of the displayed athlete: LPC amplitude at medial and right parietal recording sites was
largest for images of leading athletes, smaller for athletes currently in a draw, and smallest
for images of trailing athletes. Not only does this reflect the assumed subtle differences
in motivational relevance of the nonverbal cues, but its topography also closely matches
previous findings of a central-to-posterior peak of the LPC (Kuhr, Schomberg, Gruber, &
Quirin, 2013; Weinberg & Hajcak, 2011) with a slight right-lateralization during evaluative
judgments (Cacioppo, Crites, & Gardner, 1996). Interestingly, the LPC increase for
leading as compared to trailing athletes was not only substantial and significant, but also
related to individual score-estimation performance across participants. A strong LPC-
based differentiation of leading and trailing athletes was associated with more accurate
estimations of whether an athlete was currently in the lead. This indicates that the LPC
modulation was not a byproduct or side effect, but rather an index of a relevant neural
process that fed into overt behavior.
One might object that we cannot fully rule out that something other than the motiva-
tional relevance of the nonverbal cues in the images elicited the observed LPC modulation.
It cannot be a trivial aftereffect of physical differences between the images of the differ-
ent categories, as they were matched for relevant physical attributes, such as luminance,
contrast, and spatial distribution. However, one might argue that the richness or expres-
siveness of nonverbal cues in leading athletes might have necessitated an increased effort
to encode the images. However, two arguments against this alternative explanation can
be brought forward. First, even if one were to assume that nonverbal behavior displayed
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by leading athletes is more expressive or complex than that of trailing athletes, it still
seems highly unlikely that the richness of nonverbal expressions declines gradually with
decreasing score. If anything, it is conceivable that athletes currently in a draw, who
are supposably in a less emotional state than during leading or trailing, should display
the least expressive cues, which should result in the smallest LPC amplitude for draw
images if expressiveness was indeed the driver of the LPC modulation. What we did find,
however, was a stepwise reduction in LPC amplitude from lead to draw to trail images.
Thus, it would be hard to reconcile the expressiveness account with our exact pattern
of results. Second, we found a significant relation between score-estimation performance
and LPC modulation, indicating that behavioral responses in our social-perception task
were functionally related to processes indexed by the LPC. Crucially, dominance is readily
perceived from sports images (Furley & Schweizer, 2015) and is considered particularly
prominent and relevant in person perception (Rule et al., 2012), making it parsimonious
to assume that it was the dominance-based relevance of images of leading athletes that
led to a stronger LPC.
One might further object that we cannot rule out the possibility that images of leading
athletes led to increased motivated attention simply because participants’ internal repre-
sentation of the score-estimation task made them understand these images as the target
images. Although participants rated the images on a bipolar scale, they might have re-
framed their assignment as the search for signs of victory. Therefore, it might not have
been the leading athletes’ general significance in social perception and interaction, but
rather their momentary significance to solve the task that made them stand out. While
this is indeed a valid objection and further research should address this notion, it does
not question the functional significance of the LPC, which is of paramount interest to the
present thesis. This alternative account likewise implies that the particular relevance of
certain images is what drives attentional orienting, thus eliciting an increased LPC.
Publication V further corroborates the notion that the LPC is a sensitive index of sus-
tained, motivated attention, especially in the context of elementary social and affective
processes (see, e.g., Bell et al., 2015; Schupp et al., 2000). Higher-order neural hubs that
code affective information or govern the distribution of attentional resources most likely
provide top-down signals that feed, in a reentrant fashion, into structures coding basic
perceptual features, thus enhancing the visual representation of motivationally relevant
stimuli (see Liu et al., 2012; Schacht & Sommer, 2009). Admittedly, one might criticize
that our conclusion is somewhat circular: We confirm the assumed motivational relevance
of images of leading athletes by use of the LPC and, in turn, interpret this as confirma-
tion of the LPC’s involvement in indicating motivational relevance. However, our study
should by no means be regarded in isolation. Our predictions were directly and firmly
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based on previous work in the field of nonverbal behavior, as was our specific expectation
regarding LPC amplitude enhancement. Thus, negating our interpretation of the LPC
would essentially put our findings at odds with both lines of research, while an adherence
to the proposition regarding the functional significance of the LPC as an index of moti-
vated attention toward relevant sensory input provides a straightforward, parsimonious,
and comprehensive explanation.
4.2.2.4 Social Deviance and Subsequent Attention to Norms
In addition to enhancing our understanding of the behavioral and electrophysiological
signatures analyzed in studies on social proof and deviance (Publications III, IV, V ), we
also sought to advance the theoretical account itself. In a series of three ERP studies,
we first conceptually replicated the notion that norms initiate the differentiation of social
proof and deviance in neural structures coding behavioral outcomes. Moreover, we valu-
ably extended this idea by considering potential downstream consequences. We used the
advantages of ERPs to explore this neurocognitive mechanism of social influence and to
further our understanding of its psychological foundation.
To validate our own capacities and opinions, we compare our own to other people’s behav-
ior (Festinger, 1954). There are, however, crucial boundaries to the extent and stability
of this process, as laid out in Festinger’s groundbreaking theory on social comparison. He
proposed that, if we have the choice with whom to compare ourselves, we prefer to use
those whose views are already similar to our own as standards of judgment. Moreover, if
we apprehend that we hardly find social proof for our views, yet register a surplus of our
deviance from a certain group, we will cease to compare ourselves with this group. In Pub-
lication VI, we considerably extended this notion, as we demonstrated that it is not only
the objective degree of social proof that determines our inclination to compare ourselves
with others. Instead, we found that a person’s mere responsiveness to the perception of
social deviance from a group was robustly associated with participants’ propensity to shy
away from this very group’s subsequent judgments.
In the first part of the experiment reported in Publication VI, participants rated a series
of images and were informed after each judgment about how a group of four previous
participants, ostensibly drawn randomly from a prior study, had rated the same image.
In the second part, participants were asked to rate a completely novel set of images, but
they now saw the ostensible averaged ratings of the same group of participants before each
to-be-rated image. Notice that participants did not reassess the same images, but made
unrelated judgments in the first and second part of the experimental session. To make the
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impression of the group and its norms particularly vivid and memorable, we arranged four
images ostensibly depicting the participants whose judgments we had aggregated around
the averaged judgment that was presented in the center of the screen. The main focus of
our ERP analysis was on the two moments when participants processed the group norms:
after their own judgments in the first part and before their own judgments in the second
part. In the first part, we hypothesized that participants would appraise the outcome
value of the norm, that is, they would evaluate whether it constituted social proof of
their own judgments or tagged it as socially deviant. In the second part, we were interest
in how attentively participants processed the group’s norms. Given that the ostensible
group whose norms were shown in the first part was the source of the norms in the second
part as well, we assumed that the perception of group norms in the second part would be
biased based on the preceding experience of social proof and deviance in the first part.
First of all, we found that participants strongly aligned their judgments to those of the
group in the second task, in which they knew the group’s judgments before their own.
As in very similar investigations (e.g., Publication II ), this effect was most certainly of
a truly social nature. Specifically, the slow timing of the stimuli, with approximately
2 s passing on average between the onset of the norm and participants’ responses, makes
it unlikely that the display of group norms merely caused a priming effect. However,
the behavioral results were not our primary focus in this study. As hypothesized, in the
first task, we observed a typical FND during the analysis of deviance from the norm
relative to the processing of norms conveying social proof of the individual’s view. At
frontocentral electrodes, a larger negativity was found for norms disagreeing with the
individual’s judgment than for agreeing ones. Note that this need not necessarily reflect an
increase in negativity in the deviance condition, but might actually reflect an enhancement
of an underlying positivity (Baker & Holroyd, 2011; Holroyd et al., 2011). The actual
source of this effect was, however, not of primary interest in this study.
We observed a strong parietal P3 during norm processing in the second task. The pos-
terior P3 reflects the allocation of attentional resources (Polich & Criado, 2006), and its
amplitude is often found to be enhanced for stimuli of high relevance to the observer
(Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal, & Deldin, 2004) and for those requiring decisions or actions
(Polich, 2007). It has been proposed that the P3 is fed by signals from the prefrontal, the
anterior cingulate, and the orbitofrontal cortex, all of which are involved in coding the
relevance of current sensations (Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005). Fittingly,
the personal significance of a stimulus to an observer is reliably reflected in the amplitude
of the P3 (see, e.g., Gray et al., 2004; Littel, Euser, Munafò, & Franken, 2012). Crucially,
we found a significant negative relation between participants’ neural response to social
deviance in the first task (FN amplitude) and their attention toward the group norms in
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the second task (P3 amplitude): The stronger participants registered their deviance from
the group according to the FN increase, the less intensely they processed this group’s
norms during a subsequent encounter, as reflected in a smaller P3. One might be skep-
tical of such a correlation, given that it reflects the association between two measures of
brain activity induced by similar events during the same experimental session. To rule
out several trivial explanations of our finding, we conducted a series of control analyses.
First, we demonstrated that attention to group norms in the second task was not associ-
ated with neural feedback responses in general, but specifically to the response to norms
indicating social deviance: Subsequent attention to the group was not at all related to
the previous neural response to norms conveying social proof. Second, we demonstrated
that the deviance-induced FN was not associated with the P3 in general, but specifically
with P3 amplitude during subsequent norm processing: There was no correlation between
first-task FN and the P3 that was registered during the processing of the to-be-evaluated
images. Third, we still found the association when using individual FND scores by sub-
tracting proof-induced amplitude in the FN range from deviance-induced amplitude in
this time range, instead of using raw FN amplitudes triggered by norms indicating de-
viance. Fourth, we still replicated the correlation when we controlled for the amplitude
of the P3 during norm processing in the first task, thus ruling out the possibility that the
association between first-task FN and second-task P3 was only due to a trivial association
between the P3 in the second task and a similar P3-like positivity covertly underlying the
FN in the first task.
Note that we explicitly aimed to monitor participants’ subjective perception of their own
deviance from social norms. Therefore, we necessarily focused on the naturally occurring
variability of FN amplitudes across participants. A downside of this approach is, how-
ever, that the findings in Publication VI were correlational, preventing us from drawing
firm conclusions regarding causal relations between our variables. Due to the temporal
structure and organization of the experiment, we can safely preclude that attention to the
norm (second part) affected the processing of social deviance (first part). It is, however,
possible that a third variable is linked to both parameters of interest and mediates the
observed association. For example, rather trivial characteristics of our participants, such
as their general motivation, interest, or neural excitability might let us find an association
between two different measures of event-related brain activity. Alternatively, personality
features, such as (social) anxiety or neuroticism, might mediate the observed correlation
between two neural responses to social information. However, the specific direction of
our correlation makes it extremely unlikely that any of the above was the latent medi-
ator of the association. If anything, the concomitant measurement of a person’s overall
responsiveness to norms—in terms of general physiological excitability or perhaps due to
a personal interest triggered by anxiety or similar traits— should let us find a positive
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relation between two responses to social norms. What we did find, however, was that
strong responses to social deviance were associated with weak attention to later group
norms. Therefore, in the absence of a striking and convincing alternative explanation of
our findings, we tentatively posit that strong responses during the perception of one’s own
deviance from a norm entail a direct change in how intensely the respective group’s norms
are subsequently processed. This is in line with Festinger’s (1954) assertion that the pro-
cessing of others as a source of comparison is contingent upon the sufficient detection
of agreement between our own and their judgments. It seems that this principle can be
monitored at the level of basic cognitive processes, such as the deployment of attentional
resources. In fact, our own findings go beyond Festinger’s idea by suggesting that it is not
only the actual degree of disagreement, but also the subjective experience, one’s current
or general sensitivity to cues of social deviance, that shapes one’s later focus on a group’s
norms.
Interestingly, we found that the correlation between the neural response to a norm’s out-
come and the subsequent deployment of attentional resources was carried by the response
to social deviance, not to proof. First, this indicates that the detection of dissent does
play an important role in the representation of social norms. If the FND was exclusively
carried by a Rew-P induced by consent with others, the raw FN would mainly reflect an
N2-like negativity, presumably unrelated to outcome evaluation, that is not attenuated
by a simultaneous positivity (Holroyd et al., 2011). Seeing as the FN (not only the FND,
and not the Rew-P at all) was strongly associated with subsequent processing in a func-
tionally meaningful way, the FN most likely indeed reflected an outcome-related process.
This supports recent claims that neural responses to social deviance are highly relevant
signals in the assessment of norms (Kim et al., 2012; Klucharev et al., 2009; Shestakova
et al., 2013). However, this does not imply that this is always the case; rather, the circum-
stances of one’s confrontation with a norm might determine whether deviance-induced,
proof-induced, or both types of signals are the key drivers of norm evaluation.
4.2.2.5 Attentional Signatures of Social Proof and Deviance
When we observe a social norm, we obviously assess whether it signals social proof or
deviance, which we represent in the same way as behavioral outcomes, such as typical
reinforcers. Norms thus allow us to determine the appropriateness or incorrectness of our
own behavior in relation to the social standard. It seems highly likely, however, that our
immediate translation of norms into an outcome value similar to performance feedback,
reward, or punishment triggers additional processes beyond this assessment. Downstream
consequences of the early recognition of value need to be considered. There is consensus
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that the reward we associate with a stimulus feeds directly into attentional processes,
exerts a profound influence on our perceptions, and impacts even higher-order cognitive
functions (Anderson, 2013; Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011; Della Libera & Chelazzi,
2006; Serences, 2008). The reinforcing character of social norms might instigate a simi-
larly constructive deployment of attentional resources in order to favor information that
promises an improvement of one’s resources or chances at success (see Anderson, 2013).
In line with this idea, we noticed remarkable, yet previously untested and unreported
modulations of the LPC in several ERP studies on social proof and deviance (Publication
VI ; Huang et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2012). As noted earlier, there are several reports
of LPC variations during the processing of feedback (e.g., Frank et al., 2005; Pfabigan,
Alexopoulos, Bauer, Lamm, & Sailer, 2011; Pfabigan et al., 2014; West et al., 2014; West
et al., 2012). Yet, while it is unclear whether positive, negative, or both types of feedback
enhance LPC amplitudes (see Publication IV ), the variations during norm processing that
we noticed in our own and other scholars’ previous work consistently involved—at least at
the descriptive level available to us upon visual inspection—increased amplitudes during
the perception of social proof as compared to deviance.
In Publication VII, we followed up on this idea and investigated potential downstream ef-
fects of norm evaluation on attentional-selection processes. We used an adaptation of the
two-shot paradigm (Klucharev et al., 2009), yet avoided the problem of RTM altogether
by providing social-norm information in a way that is not tied to the level of participants’
initial ratings (for an extensive discussion, see Publication III ). Participants rated faces,
depicted as portrait photographs, as to their attractiveness on a 3-point scale. After each
judgment, they saw the ostensible percentage of previous participants who had rated the
current image in the same way as the actual participant. We manipulated the ostensi-
ble percentage of agreeing others to be either below or above 50%, thus signaling that
participants’ ratings deviated from or were in line with the absolute majority. In an unan-
nounced reassessment phase after the initial rating session, they rated all images again,
yet did not receive feedback anymore. As expected, participants were more likely to ad-
just their rating of images for whose assessment they purportedly did not receive support
from the majority as compared to those images for whose assessment they did receive
confirmation from the majority of previous raters. In a paradigm whose measurements
cannot be carried or inflated by RTM, we thus corroborate the claim that the percep-
tion of social proof determines the likelihood (and extent) of subsequent adjustments of
individual judgment.
Again, however, our main focus was on the analysis of ERPs. First of all, we were
able to replicate the finding of an FND during the perception of social deviance versus
proof, thus substantiating previous results showing a feedback-like assessment of social
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norms. What makes this replication particularly valuable is that we found the effect in a
different paradigm than previous studies (see, e.g., Shestakova et al., 2013). We did not
oppose the individual’s response to the group norm, both displayed in the same format
(i.e., as two ratings on the same scale). Nevertheless, we still found that perceiving
that the majority of other people does not agree with one’s own assessment elicits a
markedly different neural response than perceiving that they do. Obviously, cues as to
how other people behave are reliably used as points of reference that are compared to
one’s own behavior. More importantly, we demonstrated for the first time that the LPC
was significantly larger during the perception of social proof than during the perception of
one’s deviance from the norm. As explained in considerable detail earlier and supported
by our findings in Publication V, the LPC serves as a reliable index of sustained attention
toward motivationally relevant stimuli. Confirming our results in Publication V, we found
that the peak of differential brain activity in the LPC range elicited by proof as compared
to deviance was distributed broadly across the scalp, yet maximal at posterior sensors
with a slight tendency toward the right hemisphere (see also Cacioppo et al., 1996).
Our finding of an increased LPC for norms conveying social proof as compared to those
conveying deviance shows that the representation of norms in terms of their outcome
value obviously entails substantial modulations of essential cognitive functions.
In Publication VII, we performed another analysis that goes beyond what was previously
done in research on social norms: We analyzed neural responses to the faces during the
reassessment phase, that is, when participants saw the faces once more and gave their
follow-up ratings at the end of the experiment. We hypothesized that faces on whose
judgment one had previously agreed with the norm (proof-associated faces) should be
processed differently during the reassessment than faces on whose judgment one had dis-
agreed with the norm (deviance-associated faces). Confirming our expectations, we found
that the posterior medial P2, an index of early perceptual attention that is particularly
sensitive to the affective and motivational value of faces (Amodio, 2010b; Ito & Urland,
2005), was larger in amplitude for proof-associated than deviance-associated faces. We
thus show for the first time that downstream consequences of the outcome deduced from
norms and their (dis)agreement with the individual’s judgments include not only modu-
lations of immediate attentional processes triggered by the appearance of the norms, but
also attentional effects on the much later processing of norm-related stimuli. This is in line
with the general idea that previously perceived norms inform subsequent representations
of the stimuli to which they pertain (Zaki et al., 2011).
The most relevant and provoking findings in Publication VII were modulations of late
attentional selection during norm processing (LPC effect) and early attentional selection
(P2 effect) during a later encounter with the items. Interestingly, both findings can be
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explained by a common cognitive principle: In the absence of any notable losses, reward-
ing stimuli are attended to particularly intensely (Anderson, 2013). This mechanism of
value-guided attention has recently been demonstrated with social forms of reward, such
as smiling faces (Anderson, 2015). Fittingly, perceiving one’s agreement with a norm
appears to entail an enhancement of sustained attention, presumably to thoroughly en-
code the stimulus which one obviously judges in a socially rewarding way (see Schacht &
Sommer, 2009). Moreover, during a subsequent evaluation of the faces, we still seem to
put particular emphasis on stimuli that are associated with social reward (i.e., those for
whose assessment we perceived social proof). The latter finding is particularly striking,
as it represents the first demonstration of continuing effects of norm-evaluations on basic
cognitive functions.
We thus valuably extend earlier reports on the process of comparing social norms with
our own judgments to determine the appropriateness of our own views (Kim et al., 2012;
Klucharev et al., 2009; Klucharev et al., 2011; Shestakova et al., 2013) by showing that
the output of this comparison, the evaluation of our own behavior, feeds into essential
attentional-selection processes even much later. It seems as if our perception of a stimulus
is guided by how well our own behavior toward this stimulus matches a social norm. It
has been proposed that the P2 reflects the automatic prioritization of meaningful content
(Carretié et al., 2004; van Hooff, Crawford, & van Vugt, 2011). This would suggest that
even in the absence of control or intent, we might be driven to attend to stimuli promising
consent with others more strongly than to those that are associated with social conflict.
Clearly, we cannot fully determine on the basis of our experiment, in which only proof
and deviance were compared without a neutral baseline, whether the P2 effect actually
reflects increased attention toward proof-associated stimuli, decreased attention toward
deviance-associated stimuli (similar to an evasion of objects promising dissonance and
conflict), or both. Nevertheless, both ERP findings (LPC and P2) consistently indicate
that attentional selection is sensitive to the reinforcing character of social norms. This
is in keeping with the idea that the deployment of attentional resources follows value-
based information and guides our system to encode potentially advantageous information
(Anderson et al., 2011).
4.2.2.6 Social Proof Based on Observed Preferences
The neurocognitive basics of the representation of social norms relative to our own judg-
ments seem somewhat robust given the fact that multiple studies using variable setups,
stimuli, and group scenarios provided converging evidence of the involvement of processes
related to outcome assessment (see Publication I for an overview). Notably, however,
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they all share a rather basic conception: The individual makes an overt judgment and
is then confronted with the group’s average or majority judgment. While this certainly
captures and epitomizes the general idea of how we assess norms, it does not cover all
aspects of how social influence actually works. Norms in this paradigm directly follow
the individual’s own judgment. Moreover, this often includes a placative juxtaposition
of individual and group judgments, usually placing them next to each other on the same
display (Huang et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2012; Klucharev et al., 2009; Shestakova et al.,
2013). The temporal and spatial proximity of individual decisions and group norms cer-
tainly triggers a particularly—perhaps unrepresentatively—vigorous comparison of both
pieces of information. When we learn about social norms in real life, though, this often
happens in regard to stimuli that we did not evaluate only a second ago. Rather, we
develop our own attitudes over time and are confronted with other people’s judgments
of a certain stimulus at a more or less unanticipated point in time. Also, we often do
not learn about norms as perfected as those used in typical experiments, where they were
conveyed in the shape of averaged group ratings, majority judgments, or the percentage
of agreeing others. Instead, we often acquire our knowledge regarding social norms based
on repeated observations of other individuals’ judgments (Sherif, 1935).
In Publication VIII, we directly addressed the above concerns regarding the specificity of
previous paradigms used to study the neurocognition of social influence. We adapted a
paradigm from a previous fMRI study (Mason et al., 2009) for use in an ERP setting.
The whole session was divided into four parts: initial assessment, observation, delay,
and surprise reassessment. First, participants rated a set of 20 abstract symbols, similar
to logos or icons, on a six-point scale ranging from ugly to beautiful. This allowed us
to register participants’ attitudes in advance, thus providing us with a baseline against
which we could measure later judgments potentially affected by social influence. After
this brief introductory rating phase, participants repeatedly observed how each of twelve
other individuals had ostensibly rated the same set of abstract symbols. All 20 sym-
bols were presented twelve times, each time in a newly randomized order. Each of these
twelve cycles began with a visual notification that the judgments of a new participant
from a previous sample would now be shown. The purported judgments were delivered
in a straightforward dichotomous fashion and indicated by a colored frame surrounding
each object. Given their intuitive connotations, we presented a green frame to indicate an
ostensibly favorable attitude and a red frame to show dislike. By observing the judgments
of these mock previous participants, our actual participants could learn that some objects
were mostly liked (11 out of 12 times), while others were mostly disliked (11 out or 12
times). After a short delay, in which an irrelevant reaction-time task was administered to
keep participants engaged, they rated all items again. Crucially, during the observation
phase, we assessed ERPs to test whether participants processed items differently depend-
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ing on whether the currently displayed individual judgment did or did not match their own
attitude that had been reported earlier in the experiment in the first assessment phase.
When participants initially liked a symbol and observed a mock participant’s favorable
rating of this symbol or when they initially disliked a symbol and observed someone else’s
unfavorable rating, this constituted a match. Mismatches occurred when other people’s
unfavorable judgments were observed for initially liked symbols or when others’ favorable
judgments were observed for initially disliked symbols. Thus, we again focused on the
evaluation of other people’s judgments relative to one’s own stance (Klucharev et al.,
2009), yet in a more natural context in which no artificially aggregated group judgments
were presented and no overly suggestive temporal or spatial juxtaposition of participants’
and other people’s judgments was displayed.
We first conducted a behavioral pilot experiment to ascertain that the colors themselves
did not affect participants’ ratings. One might argue that green and red convey a certain
valence even without any social connotation (Gil & Le Bigot, 2014). If this were the case,
one should observe an influence of the repeatedly presented colored frames on follow-up
ratings, as would be expected based on the well-established evaluative-learning effect: Si-
multaneously or consecutively pairing a neutral and a valenced stimulus multiple times
is known to lead to substantial changes in the evaluation of the originally neutral stim-
ulus to match the valence of the originally valenced stimulus (for an overview, see Gast,
Gawronski, & De Houwer, 2012). Thus, if the colors of the frames communicated a va-
lence by themselves, repeatedly presenting objects paired with either green or red frames
should lead to systematic upward and downward changes, respectively, of the objects. In
the pilot experiment, however, we found no trace of a significant influence of the frame
colors when they were presented without a social meaning (non-social group). When the
colors did represent the ostensible judgments of previous participants (social group), we
indeed observed a substantial influence of the colored frames: Objects assumed to be liked
by many others were rated significantly more favorably than objects assumed to be liked
only by a single observer. Thus, the colors per se were no effective carriers of meaning
and valence, conveying an evaluative information only when the observer assumed that
they indicated the preferences of others.
In the main EEG experiment, we replicated the effect observed in the social group of the
behavioral pilot experiment. In the previous paragraph, we have described this crucial
behavioral effect as a main effect of the purported popularity on participants’ post-learning
ratings (baseline-corrected for their initial assessments of all objects). However, one can
also capture the effect of the observed preferences as the adjustment of ratings varying
as a function of whether or not other people’s ratings ostensibly matched the individual’s
judgments. In line with previous research, we found that participants changed their
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judgments to match more closely those of the observed others. First of all, we noticed a
general tendency of initially low ratings to be higher in the second phase (upward shift)
and of initially high ratings to be lower in the second phase (downward shift). This
pattern would be predicted based on RTM. Importantly, however, we found that the
upward rating shift of initially disliked objects was significantly stronger for objects that
were popular among others than for those that were unpopular with others. Likewise, the
downward rating shift of initially liked objects was stronger for objects unpopular among
others than for those that were popular among others. As RTM is independent of the
ostensible popularity that is randomly assigned to a given object, this difference of shifts
reveals a corrective influence of observed preferences on individual judgments.
Most importantly, at the level of ERPs, we also observed a substantial differentiation
of ostensible other people’s judgments that matched the real participants’ initially re-
ported attitudes (social proof) and those that did not match (social deviance). Observing
other people’s judgments that did not match participants’ own was accompanied by an
increased N400, broadly distributed across the scalp. Observing preferences that matched
participants’ own elicited a larger medial posterior P2 and an increased LPC. Notably, all
three effects were based on a thorough differentiation of proof and deviance during the
processing of initially liked items (i.e., the symbols that participants had initially rated
favorably), while no significant ERP effect was observed for initially disliked items.
The N400 is usually studied in the context of language processing (Kutas & Federmeier,
2011), typically to monitor neural responses to breaches of semantic expectation (Kutas
& Hillyard, 1980, 1984). However, increased N400 amplitudes have also been reported for
more complex breaches of expectation, such as stereotype-inconsistent social information
(hehman2014; Proverbio & Riva, 2009; van den Brink et al., 2012). Generally, N400
increases appear to reflect the increased effort of encoding discrepant pieces of information
(Arzouan, Goldstein, & Faust, 2007; Obleser & Kotz, 2011). Only recently, it has been
shown that social deviance in the classical paradigm (Klucharev et al., 2009) can elicit an
N400 enhancement as well (Huang et al., 2014). Huang and colleagues (2014) proposed
that the norm-based N400 modulation represents the same process of outcome evaluation
based on the prediction-error principle that is usually indicated by the FND (e.g., Kim et
al., 2012). This explanation is not entirely consistent with previous studies and theoretical
accounts relating N400 enhancements to the representation of breaches of expectation
(Kutas & Federmeier, 2011) and increased encoding effort (Obleser & Kotz, 2011), but not
to reward prediction errors. We thus propose that our findings in Publication VIII support
the notion that mismatches between one’s own attitudes and social standards, such as
norms or other people’s preferences, are processed very much like violations of expectation
(Chen et al., 2010). It seems likely that it is particularly demanding or cognitively costly
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to reconcile other people’s views and one’s own impression when they clearly contradict
each other. One presumably attempts to update one’s representation of the stimulus,
or the value associated with it, in order to avoid the dissonance of contradicting the
judgments of a relevant source. Interestingly, the increase in integration effort occurs
both somewhat quickly during one’s processing of a stimulus accompanied by a social
reference and in the absence of one’s own overt judgment.
As explained above, P2 and LPC are indices of early and late attentional selection, and
both of them have previously been shown to be sensitive to the affective and social value
of a stimulus (Amodio, 2010b; Carretié et al., 2004; Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998;
Schupp et al., 2000). Moreover, both components are known to track motivationally rele-
vant information such as during the evaluation of feedback (see Publication IV ). Fittingly,
we found a larger LPC during the observation of social proof as compared to deviance
and a larger P2 for faces previously associated with proof than for those associated with
deviance in Publication VII. In Publication VIII, we confirm our own data and interpreta-
tion regarding the role of attentional processes in norm assessment. It seems as if we are
inclined to prioritize stimuli that promise social reward in terms of consent with others on
these stimuli’s evaluation. Both rather early, perception-related attentional mechanisms
(P2) and a late, sustained enhancement of encoding (LPC) reflect this bias toward items
associated with social proof. This is in keeping with the general idea of value-driven
attention in both social (Anderson, 2015) and non-social domains (Anderson, 2013).
We observed a significant P2 effect of social (mis)match in Publication VIII, in which
no overly obvious confrontation of participants’ and other people’s judgments was pre-
sented. In previous studies, in which we used somewhat blunt juxtapositions of individual
judgments and norms, we did not observe such an early P2 effect, and the earliest differ-
entiation of proof and deviance was the FND around 300 ms (Publications VI, VII ). One
might object that it is utterly counterintuitive that a less obvious confrontation triggers
an earlier differentiation of social proof and deviance than more obvious juxtapositions.
Interestingly, however, we found a somewhat similar shift toward earlier effects in outcome
processing when using ambiguous instead of unambiguous feedback in a simple learning
task (Publication IV ). Admittedly, the specifics of the early effects of outcome representa-
tion in the non-social learning task (Publication IV ) were quite different from the effects
induced by observing other people’s preferences (Publication VIII ): In the learning task, a
frontocentral P2 was found to be increased for negative feedback, while a larger posterior
P2 for positive outcomes was observed during the observation of other people’s pref-
erences. Nevertheless, both studies converge in demonstrating earlier, attention-related
effects in situations in which the assessment of behavioral outcomes is not quite so simple.
This might indicate a general principle of processing outcome information, such as norms
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or feedback words, more vigorously, attentively, and quickly under uncertainty or higher
cognitive demand (see Publication IV ). Whether positive or negative outcomes are pri-
oritized during such early steps of analysis might depend on situational constraints. The
idea of an early negativity bias in demanding feedback processing, yet an early positivity
bias in demanding social-proof processing is in keeping with the observation that nega-
tive information generally appeared to attract more attention during non-social feedback
processing, while positive outcomes seemed to be favored during norm processing: Larger
LPC amplitudes indicating enhanced late attentional selection were found for negative as
compared to positive feedback words (Publication IV ), yet for positive as compared to
negative social outcomes (Publications VI, VII, VIII ). This might reflect a true difference
in how we assess reward or punishment for our actions in a non-social versus social con-
text. Alternatively, this might simply be a side effect of different outcome ratios. In our
learning task with simple feedback words (Publication IV ), negative feedback occurred
slightly less frequently than positive feedback, presumably making the former a more in-
formative event. In contrast, in our studies on social norms (Publications VI, VII, VIII ),
negative outcomes (norms conveying social deviance) were as frequent as positive out-
comes (norms conveying social proof) or even more frequent. This might have reduced or
even overturned a bias toward negative feedback (see Conclusion and Outlook for further
discussion of this issue).
Finally, I would like to return to our finding that social proof and deviance were thor-
oughly differentiated for items toward which the individual held a positive attitude, while
no such effects were observed for stimuli that participants initially expressed to dislike
(Publication VIII ). Four potential explanations of this asymmetry are conceivable. First,
we might generally be inclined to find social proof for our selective preferences, not for our
rejections. Therefore, we might attend to social standards regarding our own favorable
opinions, but not our less relevant unfavorable views. Second, the comparison of another
person’s judgments and one’s own might not primarily rely on one’s stable attitude to-
ward the currently observed item, but on the retrieval of one’s earlier explicit assessment
of it. Positive judgments might simply be memorized or retrieved better than negative
evaluations. Third, previous studies suggest that social deviance is particularly salient
whenever a norm indicates that an individual judgment is lower—that is, more skeptical,
less indulging—than a social reference (Huang et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2012). Crucially, if
one compares one’s own judgment with a single other individual’s (as in Publication VIII ),
one might use one’s own judgment as the fixed reference against which the other person’s
responses are compared. Thus, the typical roles of to-be-reviewed judgment and social
reference, usually assigned to the participant and the ostensible group, respectively, might
be reversed. Hence, social deviance for items initially liked by the participant (i.e., items
rated less favorably by the ostensible other individual than by the actual participant)
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would represent the case of judgments being lower than the point of reference. Given the
potential reprehensibility of downward deviations in evaluative judgments (Kim et al.,
2012), this might be particularly salient, leading to a careful differentiation of social proof
and deviance. Fourth, due to the intuitive and otherwise unproblematic choice of colors,
deviation from initially favorable views were always indicated by a red frame surrounding
an object. Red might simply have signaled social deviance more distinctly, leading to
strong effects of deviance versus proof only in these trials, while observed upward devia-
tions, conversely indicated by a green frame, might have been less expressive. All of these
possibilities do not question the overall interpretation of our findings in Publication VIII,
yet they should be carefully tested in future studies.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
Social influence clearly is one of the classical issues of (social) psychology, and to this
very day, its importance both in basic and applied research remains eminent (Cialdini &
Goldstein, 2004; McDonald & Crandall, 2015). The contemporary approach of studying
the neural functions and, relatedly, the steps of cognitive processing involved in it provides
a novel perspective to our understanding of the elementary principles of social influence
(Izuma, 2013) as well as possible applications thereof (Stallen & Sanfey, 2015). Not only
do we know more about general micro-level processes and mental operations that con-
tribute to our susceptibility to social influence (Falk et al., 2012), but we also begin to
develop a refined picture of who is likely to be influenced (Falk et al., 2014), with which
consequences (Cruwys, Bevelander, & Hermans, 2015), and to which potential benefit
(Falk et al., 2010). One of the achievements of this line of research might be that the
pervasiveness and effectuality of social influence seem slightly more comprehensible given
our insight into which profound, well-trained, and highly adapted neurocognitive pro-
cesses mediate the impact of other people on the individual (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al.,
2010). Western societies in particular tend to view conformal behavior as a sign of weak-
ness (Bond & Smith, 1996; Markus & Kitayama, 1994) and do not tire of emphasizing
its potential harm (Albert, Chein, & Steinberg, 2013; Milgram, 1963; Rose, Bearden, &
Teel, 1992; Steinberg, 2008). But even though it is neither among its goals nor within its
rights for psychology to blindly exculpate individuals who abide by questionable norms, a
deeper understanding of the intricate principles of social influence might allow us to adopt
an open, less judgmental approach to what is sometimes, yet not always, a condemnable
facet of behavior. Also, in order to deal with those excrescences of social influence that
are indisputably dangerous, an advanced understanding of its mechanisms would clearly
be beneficial. Beyond that, we might even be able to use our knowledge to actively apply
social influence in service of objectively desirable outcomes. Interestingly, the transfer
of fundamental social-influence knowledge to real-world issues is neither far-fetched, nor
a sales pitch of basic researchers. Recent studies have convincingly demonstrated that
social influence shapes even relevant aspects of individual behavior in real-life situations
(Bond et al., 2012; Nook & Zaki, 2015). Moreover, we are currently beginning to fathom
the impressive potential of social-influence campaigns that are directly informed by neu-
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rophysiological data (Cascio, O’Donnell, Bayer, Tinney, & Falk, 2015; Falk et al., 2016;
O’Donnell & Falk, 2015). It thus seems that expanding our knowledge of the neural and
cognitive principles of social influence is as topical as it is relevant and promising.
5.1 Extending our Understanding of Social Influence
In the present thesis, I have largely focused on the influence of social norms on indi-
vidual behavior. Typically, two basic types of norms and their respective influences are
distinguished (Cialdini et al., 1990). However, it should be noted that the distinction of
informational influence generated by descriptive norms and normative influence generated
by injunctive norms, although longstanding and established, is difficult or even artificial at
times (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) and was not of paramount interest at this early point
in our line of research (see also Klucharev et al., 2009). Therefore, we did not specifically
aim to induce only one specific type of influence while fully controlling for any contribution
of the other type. Nevertheless, the obvious characteristics of our tasks and experimental
setups suggest that we have covered almost exclusively descriptive social norms, seeing as
we (a) used simple depictions of majority behavior without applying normative pressure
such as having participants and confidents interact, and (b) asked participants to per-
form rather special tasks—for example, evaluating ambiguous images—that might have
boosted the informational value of norms (Publications II, VIII ). The same arguments
can be made for many previous studies (e.g., Chen, Wu, et al., 2012; Germar et al.,
2014; Huang et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2012; Klucharev et al., 2009; Klucharev et al., 2011;
Trautmann-Lengsfeld & Herrmann, 2013), which is why our knowledge on the neurocog-
nition of social norms is presumably based mostly on descriptive norms. This should
be noted early-on and kept in mind to appreciate the scope and limits of the following
discussion of other scholars’ and my own research.
To date, we know that the neurocognition of social influence based on descriptive norms
essentially comprises (at least) two different mechanisms: modified representations of
to-be-judged features and the representation of social proof and deviance as behavioral
outcomes. While the former is particularly relevant in situations resembling the frequently
used one-shot paradigm with norms preceding one’s analysis of the to-be-judged stimu-
lus, the latter applies to scenarios modeled by the two-shot paradigm. Therefore, our
focus of analysis and the specific configuration of a social interaction largely determine
which process applies. As mentioned in the introduction, the two accounts are not mu-
tually exclusive, but rather complementary. Zaki and colleagues (2011) used a two-shot
paradigm, yet focused on the neural representation of the to-be-evaluated images during
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the reassessment phase, in which a direct modulation of the essential computation of
value could be observed. Similarly, we combined a two-shot paradigm including the typi-
cal analysis of reinforcement-related responses during norm processing with the idea that
basic attentional functions during stimulus processing in the reassessment phase might be
informed by preceding norms’ outcome value (Publication VII ). These two studies thus
neatly exemplify the coexistence and compatibility of both approaches to social influence
(see also Publication I ).
5.1.1 The Fusion of Actual and Norm-Conveyed Input
When norms precede our judgments, they obviously have the potential to modify our
internal representation of what is to be judged, thus exerting a profound influence on how
we perceive the world (Publication I ; Germar et al., 2016; Germar et al., 2014; Koban &
Wager, 2016; Zaki et al., 2011). Moreover, the overall depth of our representation of to-
be-judged information is a key determinant of how norms affect our decisions (Publication
II ), presumably moderating the direct influence of norms on our mental representations
of to-be-judged items (Germar et al., 2016). However, not only norms themselves (i.e.,
their actual content) alter essential neural computations, but also the reinforcing value of
a norm (i.e., its status as rewarding or punishing). Stimuli associated with social proof
appear to be processed more intensely not only during the actual moment in which we
learn about the norm in association with the item to which it pertains (Publication VIII ),
but also when we subsequently encounter this item again (Publication VII ). Already at
the level of early perceptual attention, we display a bias toward consent-related stimuli.
This might be an instance of how value drives our attentional and perceptual system
(Anderson et al., 2011; Serences, 2008). Several studies thus concordantly demonstrate
how the most basic cognitive processes are already informed by other people’s behavior,
which fiercely reiterates the assertion that social forces substantially shape our take on
reality (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). One might have assumed that there is a long-lasting
coexistence of our very personal representation of the world around us and other people’s
impressions, and that both sources of information are weighed and reconciled at a late
stage, such as shortly before one opts for a certain judgment. This does, however, seem
utterly unlikely, given the abovementioned findings. Our own perceptions and those of
others appear to fuse at an early point, such that even the most basic neural operations are
functions of both the input provided by our sensory system in regard to the to-be-judged
object and what we learn from relevant social sources. This is well in line with the old
concept of human suggestibility (Hull, 1933), which actually inspired some of the earliest
research into social influence (Asch, 1955). But while classical sociopsychological research
in the tradition of Asch and Sherif has ventured more into the motives and antecedents of
72 Conclusion and Outlook
conformity (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), it is only the contemporary,
neuroscientific approach to social influence that revisits and expands this concept.
Interestingly, the direct impact of social norms on how we represent to-be-judged features
might be a neurocognitive explanation of one of the types of conformity explained in the
introduction, namely conversion (Zaki et al., 2011). As noted earlier, while we sometimes
only comply publicly to maintain a group’s grace, we sometimes truly and internally
adopt social norms. Descriptive norms in particular trigger these revisions of our initial
stances (McDonald & Crandall, 2015). Fittingly, all studies reporting actual modifications
of the representation of to-be-judged features employed scenarios that included simple
descriptive norms most likely exerting informational influence. But the fact that social
influence entails a consolidation of actual (sensory) and purported (norm-based) input
should not be seen as a sign of weak dependence. Rather, it suggests that our take on
reality is not unbiased. Just as we use gating and filter mechanisms such as selective
attention to somehow cope with the endless stream of input, relevant social norms seem
to be superimposed upon our own representations, much like a filter that adjusts and
shifts the shape of a function. As our conspecifics are often reliable sources of information
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), we might have developed an adaptive system that incorporates
such potentially beneficial affluxes into our representation of reality (see also Claidière &
Whiten, 2012). After all, there is broad consensus that, in a general sense, higher levels
of information, such as expectations and prior knowledge, thoroughly infuse earlier levels
of representation in a top-down fashion (Friston, 2005; Stokes, Atherton, Patai, & Nobre,
2011; Summerfield & Egner, 2009), thus presumably increasing both the performance and
the efficiency of our neural apparatus (see Rao & Ballard, 1999).
In light of the above observations, I would like to return to a remark that I made in
the beginning of this synopsis: To many, social influence might have an air of triviality.
Clearly, conformity is often obvious and easy to spot, as demonstrated most strikingly
in some of the earliest studies in this field (Asch, 1951). I do believe, though, that
this newly emerging line of research into social influence, including our own findings
regarding the effects of observed judgments on attentional processes (Publications VI,
VII, VIII ), strongly suggests that part of the impact of others on ourselves is actually
quite subtle. Perhaps without our knowledge, our perceptual analysis of sensory input,
our formation of memories, and our valuation of objects are systematically affected by
preceding social norms (Edelson et al., 2011; Germar et al., 2016; Germar et al., 2014;
Zaki et al., 2011). What is more, we are apparently even biased during the processing
of norms and associated stimuli, focussing more on episodes conveying consent between
ourselves and the norm than on episodes that signify our deviance from the social standard
Conclusion and Outlook 73
(Publications VI, VII, VIII ). The reach of social influence thus clearly appears to exceed
its openly visible grasp, making it a little less trivial.
5.1.2 The Reinforcing Character of Social Norms
The notion that norms initiate the differentiation of social proof and deviance in neural
structures coding behavioral outcomes (Klucharev et al., 2009), as well as the idea that
this makes reinforcement a key principle of social influence (Izuma, 2013; Klucharev et al.,
2011; Shestakova et al., 2013), have received much attention in the past few years. Not
only are we able to convert norms into cues conveying behavioral outcomes, but we are
even able to perform this conversion remarkably quickly, as value-related signals during
norm processing occur as early as 250 ms after the onset of the norm (Publications VI,
VII ; Chen, Wu, et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2012; Shestakova et al., 2013). Moreover, the
outcome signal, presumably generated in cortical and limbic neuron populations whose
cell bodies are located in midbrain areas (Klucharev et al., 2009), obviously feeds into
a variety of subsequent processes. First, it might directly inform upcoming behavioral
adjustments (Klucharev et al., 2009; Klucharev et al., 2011; but see Kim et al., 2012;
Shestakova et al., 2013), which corroborates the notion that conformist behavior is the
consequence of reinforcement learning (see Publication I ). Second, the allocation of atten-
tional resources depends on norm-triggered outcome signals (Publications VI, VII, VIII ),
both immediately during the analysis of the norm, which can, but need not, include the
simultaneous encoding of the specific stimulus to which the current norm pertains, and
during later encounters with norm-related stimuli. As noted earlier, this is in line with
the idea that attention works directly as a function of the value associated with a stimu-
lus (Anderson et al., 2011). This extension of the concept of reinforcement principles in
social influence relies primarily on the research that my colleagues and I have performed.
It expands the scope of this theoretical approach by adding downstream consequences
of complex social value signals and suggests that norms exert a subtle influence on how
we select and prioritize sensory input. It therefore emphasizes once more the potency of
norms to shape how we perceive and represent the world.
We have added a novel perspective in regard to the situational requirements and deter-
minants of how we process other people’s judgments in relation to our own (Publication
VIII ). We have shown that not directly juxtaposing a person’s own and another person’s
behavior does change the processes involved, as we did no longer find an FND during the
observation of deviant as compared to matching judgments. However, we still found neu-
ral signatures of the differentiation of judgments conveying social proof and judgments
conveying deviance at early, mid-latency, and late stages of processing. The outcome
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generated by the rapid comparison of one’s own attitude and a social reference was reg-
istered during early attentional selection; as variations of the effort to reconcile semantic
input; and during the sustained prioritization of stimuli, potentially affecting perceptual
encoding. Thus, the general concept that the human mind quickly and thoroughly dif-
ferentiates social proof and deviance still applies, despite considerable changes to the
scenario. During the mere observation of other people’s judgments, which is most likely
the typical format of how we apprehend social norms (Sherif, 1935), we appear to engage
in the evaluation of our own beliefs in light of social references (and potentially vice versa;
see Publication VIII ) just as much as during the assessment of aggregated norms directly
juxtaposed to our own decisions.
Most importantly, the effects of social proof on attentional-selection processes suggest
that agreeing with a norm is a desirable or at least particularly informative type of social
outcome (but see Anderson, 2016). For feedback processing in general, there has recently
been a shift to emphasize the importance of reward signals over error or punishment re-
sponses (Publication IV ). Likewise, several of our findings indicate that we are attuned
to prioritize stimuli associated with social proof, rather than being in a constant mode
to detect our own errors and the need for adjustment (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). Our
data indicate that we do not encode episodes of disagreement, which should eventually
trigger conformal adjustment, more thoroughly than those of agreement. On the con-
trary, we seem to encode with particular emphasis the moments and stimuli associated
with consent. This idea is corroborated by findings from a neuroimaging study suggesting
that consent-induced positive affect is a predictor of conformity to one’s peers (Stallen
et al., 2013; but see Deuker et al., 2013). Overly simplified, this might be called a pos-
itivity bias in the assessment of social norms. We have recently suggested that safe or
predictable environments entail a focus on potential reward, while uncertainty provokes
an enhanced focus on errors (Publication IV ). Making somewhat inconsequential judg-
ments and learning whether or not this is consistent with other people’s behavior is not
a particularly uncertain or threatening context, which is why we might tend to focus
on the possibility of gains rather than the threat of loss (see Anderson, 2013; but see
Anderson, 2016). Previous interpretations of the involvement of reinforcement-learning
mechanisms in social influence as a sign of the individual’s fear of being different and urge
to avoid social deviance (Kim et al., 2012) might have been incomplete. Admittedly, our
findings in Publication VI indicate that deviance-induced neural responses, as indicated
by the raw FN, do reflect a functionally significant process of norm evaluation that even
feeds into subsequent processing. Therefore, it is not exclusively the determination of so-
cial proof that dominates our analysis of social norms in relation to our own judgments.
However, our findings regarding both early and late attentional selection mechanisms con-
cordantly indicate that we appear to seek social proof at least as much as we try to avoid
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social deviance. Interestingly, there might be another simple, procedural explanation for
this positivity bias in how we attend to norms, as will be discussed further below in a
preliminary cognitive model of social proof and deviance.
The fact that reinforcement is an integral part of social influence might entice us to as-
sume that processes of reinforcement learning represent the neural substrates of normative
influence. Conformity driven by normative concerns is the adjustment of one’s views to
a norm in order to be affiliated and avoid exclusion; in other words, it is conformity
triggered by one’s drive to gain social reward and to elude social punishment (Deutsch &
Gerard, 1955; Kelman, 1961). Our own assumptions about other people’s expectations
fuel our longing for agreement and fear of being different, which then shapes our behavior
to comply with the norm, much like the anticipation of reward and punishment shapes
the likelihood of a certain behavior in general (Thorndike, 1911). However, it should be
noted that informational influence could and should rely on our tendency to seek reward
and avoid punishment just as well. Driven by our will to act accurately, we turn to other
people’s behavior as a valid source of information. Perceiving a norm that signals that
we are in line with others should therefore be perceived as predictive of reward (in the
sense of having an appropriate representation of reality), while deviating from the norm
should elicit the anticipation of being punished (in the sense of being incorrect in one’s
views). As explained above, most, perhaps even all studies demonstrating the involve-
ment of reinforcement learning in social influence were based on scenarios that delivered
descriptive norms triggering informational influence (see, e.g., Klucharev et al., 2009).
Spoken more generally, the rewarding or punishing character of social norms does in no
way favor the normative account of social influence over the informational one; both mo-
tivational foundations should involve reinforcement-learning processes. The notion that
common neurocognitive principles subserve normative and informational influence corrob-
orates the assumption that the two most likely motivational underpinnings of conformal
adjustment are not easily separable (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).
5.1.3 An Integrative Cognitive Model of Social Proof and Deviance
The process of determining social proof and deviance is less straightforward than might
be assumed at first glance. The series of studies published over the course of the last
few years, including my own studies, can be integrated into a preliminary model of the
computations that contribute to and are sparked by the representation of social proof and
deviance. As will be explicated in the following, this represents a consolidation of several
claims and ideas that were only loosely connected and have not been integrated before.
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As a start, a few general assumptions about how we assess norms need to be made. I
propose that the process of norm assessment can be disassembled into several steps: access
to content; comparison of individual and norm behavior; translation into an outcome.
First, when confronted with a descriptive social norm, we need access to its actual content,
that is, how exactly the majority behaves. Second, based upon that, a comparison of this
content with the content of our own behavior is needed. That is, we assess whether the
two are the same (which constitutes social proof) or different (which conveys our own
social deviance); in case of social deviance, we additionally need to identify in which
direction our own behavior deviates from the norm. Of course, this comparison is only
necessary if it is not already delivered to us. In several studies (e.g., Klucharev et al., 2009;
Klucharev et al., 2011; Shestakova et al., 2013), the numerical distance between individual
and group judgment was shown in addition to the norm itself. Therefore, participants
did not have to perform a comparison anymore. In other studies, however, only the norm
was presented, without a depiction of the degree of agreement with the individual’s own
judgment (e.g., Chen, Wu, et al., 2012; Kim et al., 2012). Consequently, the comparison
still had to be performed. Third, the output of this comparison—irrespective of whether
it is presented to us or we have to work it out ourselves—needs to be translated into the
format of a simple outcome, that is, whether our behavior promises reward (in case of
social proof) or punishment (in case of social deviance).
Having established the putative components of norm assessment, I propose a broader
functional model of cognitive processes that feed into or are triggered by the representation
of social proof and deviance. This preliminary model is shown in Figure 1. The crucial
external, overt events involved in the overall process are the appearance of a to-be-judged
object, a social norm, and the individual’s judgment (see black boxes; to be read from top
to bottom along the light blue bar). Note that this model assumes that it is not necessary
for the individual’s initial appraisal of the to-be-judged object, occurring immediately
after the object, to be explicitly stated. The general process of evaluating norms to
determine social proof or deviance is not fully contingent upon a direct juxtaposition of
one’s own view and the norm (see Publication VIII ). Therefore, we merely assume that the
object triggers an appraisal that can, but need not, be uttered. The assessment of norms
presumably encompasses several processing threads, as explained above. For the sake of
simplicity, these aspects of norm processing are not shown separately in the depiction of
the proposed model. We do need to assume, however, that we have almost immediate
access to a norm’s content and, derived from the comparison of one’s own judgment and
the norm, to its outcome value. For example, when we learn that a group has rated a face
as maximally beautiful, we should not only represent this specific norm (“face is perceived
as beautiful”), but also what this means for our own judgment (“my rating was correct”
versus “my rating was incorrect, as it was too low”).
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Figure 1: Preliminary model of cognitive processes that contribute to or are sparked by the representation
of social proof and deviance. This model is a tentative synthesis of several previous findings as well as
some of my own studies presented in this thesis. The figure should be read from top to bottom along
the light blue bar. Black boxes represent overt, external events; gray boxes indicate internal, cognitive
processes. Note that the putative cognitive components of norm assessment (access to content; comparison
of individual and norm behavior; translation into an outcome) are not included in this model for the sake
of simplicity. See text for details on the model.
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As with other types of outcome (Schultz & Dickinson, 2000), a prediction regarding which
norm outcome and, based thereupon, which specific norm content is to be expected should
develop, fed by a stored norm statistic, similar to a counter that aggregates the outcome
value of all previously processed norms. The norm statistic at time point t could simply be
the mean of the outcome value of all norms (N ) that have occurred, in a given situation or
in regard to a certain issue, up to this point in time (e.g., +1 for proof; −1 for deviance).
For example, if I received social proof for nine out of ten previous judgments, my norm
statistic would be ((9×1)+(1×−1))/10 = 0.8. Thus, I would clearly expect the next norm
to provide support for my own judgment. Note that we have proposed that there is some
interindividual variation as to how strongly a person responds to social deviance, which
should feed into how strongly one attends to this group in the future (Publication VI ).
This variability could be realized in the model by assigning different outcome values to
proof and deviance, perhaps even asymmetrically (e.g., +1 for proof; −2 for deviance).
When the actual norm is presented, two things are bound to happen: First, its outcome
value adds to the norm statistic. Second, the comparison of the actual norm and the norm
prediction leads to the determination of the prediction error (actual norm minus predicted
norm). The case that the prediction was completely right, that is, identical to the actual
norm is not considered in this model due to the fact that this should be far less relevant
to the learning process than erroneous predictions (Schultz, 2006). Such errors of the
system’s predictions can be divided into positive and negative errors. Positive prediction
errors occur if the outcome value is higher than predicted. In the above example, my
averaged norm statistic, and thus my prediction, is 0.8. Perceiving social proof (+1) is
an outcome that is still slightly higher than my prediction, which makes this a positive
prediction error. Negative prediction errors occur if the outcome is below the prediction.
For example, perceiving social deviance (−1) would be way lower than my prediction,
making this a strong negative prediction error.
Based on previous studies, it stands to reason that if there is a positive prediction error
(see green arrow), this instigates a thorough attentional selection and encoding of the ob-
ject as well as its obviously correct evaluation. If there is a negative prediction error (see
red arrow), this should trigger an increased effort to integrate one’s initial assessment,
the norm content, and the object. In either case, the individual arrives at an updated
representation of the to-be-judged object (object’). Moreover, the perception of prediction
errors, combined with one’s previously aggregated norm statistic, should feed into one’s
constantly updated impression of the group. As predicted by social-comparison theory
(Festinger, 1954), too much deviation—that is, too many negative prediction errors in the
present model—should lead to a derogation and subsequent evasion of the group, which
would break up the cycle and end the overall process. However, this statistic might not
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only reflect the actual frequency of proof and deviance, but also an individual’s respon-
siveness to dissent (Publication VI ). Note that this implies that the organism depicted
in this model tends to seek a certain proportion of positive prediction errors: Only if it
experiences enough moments of social proof, will it hold a sufficiently favorable view of the
group and, hence, not abort the cycle. Crucially, my proposition of a consensus-seeking,
self-aborting system could provide an explanation of the well-established notion that we
generally tend to expect consensus with our own views (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977).
Based on the bias to selectively expose ourselves—in the long run, yet potentially when-
ever possible—to groups favoring norms that confirm our own views, we might develop a
generalized expectation of agreement, even if it is objectively inappropriate (see Sherman,
Presson, & Chassin, 1984).
One assumption of this model is that we keep track of the outcome derived from norms,
which feeds into our impression of the group and determines our prediction of upcoming
norms. Interestingly, in several previous studies, participants were exposed more fre-
quently to conflicting than to agreeing norms (Kim et al., 2012; Klucharev et al., 2009;
Klucharev et al., 2011; Shestakova et al., 2013). Therefore, the attentional bias toward
social proof might be a consequence of the rareness and, thus, the particular relevance of
this type of outcome. Imagine that the system is generally inclined to favor—at least in
the long run—sources of feedback that do not contradict our own views too frequently.
Under these circumstances in particular, social proof coming from a group whose norms
conflict more often with our own views than they agree with them should be a consid-
erably striking and notable event. Considering the idea of prediction errors based on an
internal statistic of previous norm outcomes, with deviance representing a negative value
(−1) and proof a positive value (+1), one should develop a negative overall outcome
prediction (e.g., −0.5), such that the positive prediction error triggered by social proof
(+1.5) should simply be stronger than the negative prediction error triggered by social
deviance (−0.5). Our attentional bias toward positive outcomes could therefore be—at
least in part—explained by the asymmetry of outcome frequencies.
The proposed model represents a reorganization of our knowledge on the neurocognition
of social norms. First, it successfully consolidates several previous findings, particularly
those regarding reinforcement-related processes. Second, it incorporates elements from
classical psychological and neurophysiological theories, such as on reward processing, on
social comparison, and on consensus expectation. Third, it unifies ideas from different
methods (behavioral, neuroimaging, ERP) and rather different paradigms. Clearly, how-
ever, the model is based on a limited number of observations, as previous research on
the neurocognition of social influence is far from exhaustive, and it is speculative in some
parts. For example, whether or how we keep track of the overall record of the outcome
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value of a group’s norms has yet to be clarified. Also, the notion of an intensified in-
tegration process in the case of deviance is based primarily on one set of data from an
idiosyncratic paradigm (Publication VIII ). In sum, the model is clearly tentative and
requires careful examination, testing, and presumably revision in future research. How-
ever, even preliminary models have the benefit of synthesizing and explicating conceptual
ideas, thus allowing and provoking specific predictions that we can attempt to falsify in
dedicated studies to come.
5.2 Extending Our Understanding of the Social Brain
Over the course of the last decade, we have started to unravel the principles of social
functions in the human brain (Lieberman, 2007). To some, this has meant exploring
elementary functions with an inherently social meaning, often in the service of garnering
additional knowledge of the brain itself (Lieberman, 2012; Singer, 2012). Others have
understood this as the idea of dissecting complex behavior into its neurocognitive compo-
nents, thus advancing psychological theory (Amodio et al., 2013; Bartholow & Amodio,
2009). Ideally, both approaches are intertwined and inform each other (Amodio, 2010a).
The focus of the present thesis was mainly on understanding the cognitive processes in-
volved and, thus, on extending the psychological approach to social influence. However,
our data—mostly of electrophysiological nature—are also suited to contribute to a broader
understanding of the social brain.
First, somewhat specific contributions can be made. The medial frontal cortex, including
the anterior cingulate cortex, as well as subcortical structures related to affective and
value-related processes, such as the basal ganglia, are assumed to play crucial roles in
social cognition (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Izuma, 2013). Our ERP experiments confirm
this idea, as we have repeatedly shown that signatures of outcome processing, registered
at frontocentral recording sites, are pivotal in complex social processes such as assessing
proof and deviance (Publications VI, VII ). Although the nature of the FND is subject
to debate and we did not perform any source analyses, two potential generators are
typically discussed: the anterior cingulate cortex (Miltner et al., 1997) and the basal
ganglia (Foti et al., 2011). Therefore, our data indirectly support the notion that either
or both of these regions are crucially involved in human social cognition. Moreover, we
propose that the idea of value-driven attention (Anderson et al., 2011; Della Libera &
Chelazzi, 2006), potentially involving a direct, top-down modulation of neural responding
in sensory areas as well as higher-order biases of selective attention in frontal and parietal
brain areas (Serences, 2008), should be considered more explicitly in social cognition (see
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also Anderson, 2015, 2016). As social information effectively alters our computation of the
value that we assign to an object in the basal ganglia and orbitofrontal cortex (Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Zaki et al., 2011), and given our findings of norm-dependent
early and late prioritization (Publications VI, VII, VIII ), we reinforce the notion that
a key faculty of the human social brain could be a rigorous weighting of information in
primary, specialized brain areas and superordinate hubs that govern the deployment of
central attentional resources (see Nummenmaa & Calder, 2009).
Second, I believe that one general proposition regarding the principles of the social brain
can be made on the basis of what the recent work of many other scholars and myself
teaches us about the neurocognition of social influence. While this is not an entirely
novel or revolutionary idea, it does underscore contemporary views of the human mind
and brain. That reinforcement learning plays a key role in human behavior and, par-
ticularly, in decision-making is well established at this point (Lee et al., 2012). What
we begin to fathom only now is that this basic system is at the heart of more complex
aspects of individual decision-making as well. Our perception of the world is guided by
the value that we assign to objects and events, which in turn determines our behavior. In
recent years, psychology and closely related disciplines, such as behavioral and neuroeco-
nomics, have strongly bolstered this claim in regard to many types of behavior. What I
would like to emphasize, however, is that social behavior does not work much differently.
Clearly, we have partly evolved into specialized social operators, featuring a collection
of dedicated skills (such as emotions, mentalizing, or empathy), represented by specified
neural networks, which mediate how we behave and think socially (Amodio & Frith, 2006;
Singer, 2012). But this is not all there is to the human social mind. To put it bluntly,
our social environment often simply feeds into generalized systems, utterly non-social in
nature. One might even say that much of the social world does not exist as a secluded
entity within our mind and brain, represented by dedicated, highly evolved subsystems;
rather, it is often merely another instance of basic mental operations that do not seem to
differ between complex social experiences (such as learning about other people’s opinions)
and mundane, more primary types of experience (such as food, sexuality, or money). In
fields of research other than social influence, this notion has already gained momentum
over the last decade. Perhaps the most notable example is abstract and subjective social
pain, caused, for example, by being excluded from a group, which is represented in the
human brain very much like physical pain (Eisenberger, 2012; Eisenberger, Lieberman, &
Williams, 2003). This could be interpreted as a sign of how vigorous and serious social
sensations are to our cognitive system. Alternatively, though, this might just teach us
that what we perceive as two utterly different types of stimulation (physical vs. social)
are just two exemplars of a common category to our brain. We have elevated one event to
be a higher, complex, perhaps innately human experience, while the other one is treated
82 Conclusion and Outlook
as raw, basic, universal to any type of animal. Our mental computer, however, might
represent both events similarly, factually noting a considerable overlap of both types of
information, rather than dividing all input into separable, hierarchically organized classes.
In the end, social sensitivities, such as affection, longing, deviance, might just be versions
of our organism’s sensitivities in general, such as satiation, hunger, pain. What we un-
derstand as separate qualities of information might be represented almost equally in the
human brain.
The fact that one of the major principles of social norms appears to be the modulation
of the representation of to-be-judged features corroborates this very idea. As recently
demonstrated by Koban and Wager (2016), norms elicit expectations, which in turn pre-
pare our system in a way that eventually leads to changes in how we physically respond
to a subsequent stimulus (Publication I ). Again, complex social experience appears to
evoke basic, generalized functions of the cognitive apparatus. It is well established that
experiencing regularities in our perceptions quickly leads to expectations (e.g., Doherty,
Rao, Mesulam, & Nobre, 2005; Nobre, Correa, & Coull, 2007; Schnuerch, Kreitz, &
Lange, 2013), which in turn substantially alter how upcoming sensory input is processed
(Esterman & Yantis, 2010; Rohenkohl, Cravo, Wyart, & Nobre, 2012; Summerfield &
de Lange, 2014). Typically, we tend to make a thorough distinction between complex,
evolved expectations—such as those triggered by social norms—and lowly, plain expec-
tations triggered by perceptual regularities. In the end, though, our system makes use
of the same principles, initiates the same type of computation. No advanced, inherently
social operator is involved; much of the social world seems to be represented in our mind
and brain very much like more mundane stimulations.
In essence, I thus propose that—from a broader perspective—the present thesis reiterates
the claim that some of the human faculties that seem to define our most momentous
features have evolved around (and are still based upon) quite elementary, universal ca-
pacities. This is not to say that our mind is not a wondrous, impressive acquirement; after
all, there is no denying how little we know about its workings so far. Yet, perhaps we
should not yearn to discover a battery of specialized, higher-order modules (Cosmides &
Tooby, 2013); a more promising approach to our enterprise of deciphering the mind might
be to understand the small, rudimentary functions that underlie both simple and com-
plex instances of human behavior and experience. This idea of a complex machine whose
most advanced capabilities rely on a set of simple, yet essential operations seems to have
gained ground in computer science and engineering: Instead of constructing softwares
or devices with a myriad of complex functions contrived by the programmer, developers
have lately begun to implement only the basic function to learn from feedback (i.e., re-
inforcement learning) and let the system acquire more complex faculties based upon this
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central function (Moore & Atkeson, 1993). Clearly, not all that holds true for computer
systems applies to the human mind. Perhaps, though, the simple elegance and quick
rise of machine learning teaches us a lot about the plain principles of advanced human
cognition.
5.3 Limitations
Beyond doubt, no scientific work is ever without limitations. While the convergence of a
multitude of investigations in this field increases our confidence in the findings, there are
some notable shortcomings in my own studies that should be addressed. First of all, we
have used virtual settings of social influence in all of our experiments. While this does
capture the recently emerging aspect of mostly anonymous social influence in our every-
day virtual interactions (Muchnik, Aral, & Taylor, 2013), it is only an approximation to
what social influence actually looks like in the real world. Presumably, the actual presence
of others affects these processes to a large degree; for example, it might trigger normative
concerns more strongly. Also, the use of ostensibly aggregated group judgments to display
norms might artificially increase their informational value. When actually confronted with
the opinions of a few other people, we might be much more resistant and resort to their
judgments less fiercely and less frequently. Moreover, the presence of dissenters is known
to dramatically reduce the impact of the majority on the individual (Asch, 1955); we did
not address this relevant limitation of social influence in any of our studies.
A second, yet clearly related concern is that social influence is a complex process that
is hard to capture in the laboratory. We have had to simplify, break down, and idealize
the scenario. Not only might some of the real-life ingredients of social influence get lost
in the process, but this might also overly highlight some aspects. For example, norms
might be perceived, or even aggregated across individual observations, in a much more
subtle, incidental fashion. Depicting them so bluntly most likely distorts the balance of
information in real life. Moreover, the use of ERPs in particular restricted our possibilities
regarding which brain processes could be observed. While there are several well-validated
signatures of essential cognitive processes, such as attention, several mental operations
are not easily mapped to the components of an ERP. Thus, as is usually the case in
any type of research, our possibility of insight was severely limited by our choice of
method. As explained earlier, fMRI clearly has its own, severe limitations. However, being
able to monitor and explore more broadly how the brain responds to certain elements
of social-influence scenarios might have allowed us to discover different aspects of its
neurocognition.
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Third, it is generally hard to assess whether and to what extent our manipulations actu-
ally worked in the way we intended them to. Most importantly, we used cover stories in all
of our studies and told participants that they would be seeing other people’s judgments,
which we had collected in previous studies. Such a dishonest approach to psychological
research always bears the risk of not actually achieving the type of reality for all par-
ticipants that we hoped to create. Participants might have asked themselves why we
would present the judgments of others. Clearly, most of them saw right through this and
assumed that we were interested in processes of social influence. This is not problematic
per se, as we are often very much aware of other people’s potential influence in real-life
situations as well, yet we are still thoroughly influenced by others. Nevertheless, in sim-
plified laboratory scenarios, such as in my series of studies, participants might have been
cued to other people’s influence particularly strongly, much more so than in real life. This
knowledge might have distorted participants’ behavior. We cannot account for how much
a person’s explicit knowledge of (and attention to) being exposed to social influence affects
their behavior. A related issue is whether participants actually believed our cover stories
regarding the origin of the ostensible group norms. Of course, we employed paper-pencil
and face-to-face debriefings in which we tried to thoroughly assess whether participants
doubted the veracity of the norms, which would be much more detrimental to the process
than the mere knowledge what the investigation is about. If we had reason to believe that
participants did not believe our cover story, we excluded them from all analyses. More-
over, there was indirect evidence that the vast majority of our participants truly believed
in the cover stories, as they estimated in a post-experimental survey that in-group norms
agreed much more with their own assessments than norms of an out-group—even though
the norms were actually manipulated to be the same for both ostensible reference groups
(Publication VII ).
The fourth limitation is that we yet have to connect various theoretical perspectives re-
garding the principles of social influence. For example, I have mostly ignored or, at least,
not specifically focused on the matter of motives. However, to gain a comprehensive
understanding of this type of behavior, it is necessary to consider various levels of psycho-
logical assessment, rather than restricting one’s view to one aspect, such as the neural or
cognitive processes. Therefore, my work on this subject—very much like most of the field
as a whole—is still a somewhat loose and isolated accumulation of knowledge, concepts,
and ideas that is not well-connected to the substantial body of research based on decades
of behavioral studies. Clearly, we have based many of our ideas directly on sociopsy-
chological theories (such as in Publications II, VI, VII ), yet the wealth of findings and
interpretations of our own and other scholars’ work still needs to be fully and critically
integrated into the long tradition of research on social influence.
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5.4 Future Avenues
Future studies could build upon what has been uncovered so far and might directly extend
some theoretical assertions made in the recent past. For example, the idea that the
content of norms can directly shape an individual’s mental representation of the to-be-
judged feature could be tested directly by varying the tasks and investigating whether
it is indeed always norm-related, to-be-judged information that is molded by preceding
norms (see Publication I ). Our theory posits that norms on a certain feature lead to
specific expectations regarding this very feature, which then leads to a modification of
our internal representation of this specific feature. Perceptual norms thus change how we
process to-be-judged items perceptually (Berns et al., 2005), while a norm regarding the
value of something can shape our computation of value (Zaki et al., 2011), and a norm
regarding the painfulness of an upcoming stimulus alters how we process its painfulness
upon its actual occurrence (Koban & Wager, 2016), and so forth. This is, however, a
post-hoc explanation that should be put to a direct and critical test. Most importantly,
we should attempt to replicate the finding that the very neural representation that directly
governs the individual’s judgment is systematically shifted by a preceding norm (Zaki et
al., 2011).
Also, the somewhat general concept of reinforcement learning in social influence could be
extended and specified in several respects. First of all, an appropriate control condition
should be used to find out whether neural responses to social proof and deviance are
symmetrical or driven mostly by one type of outcome. For example, the ventral striatum is
assumed to code both positive and negative reward prediction errors (Schultz & Dickinson,
2000). Thus, by implementing a neutral feedback condition (e.g., without a norm or with
a norm unrelated to the current judgments), one could test whether activity in the ventral
striatum actually increases for proof and decreases for deviance—or only responds to one
type of feedback. Also, the abovementioned issue of reward expectations and prediction-
error coding should be clarified. For example, one might manipulate the ratio of proof
to deviance and monitor neural responses to both categories in order to find out whether
our value-coding system indeed keeps track of social feedback and attunes to the level of
predictable reward. Perhaps this is not the case (which would constitute a major deviation
from how outcomes are usually coded), and we have a superordinate expectation of social
agreement (Ross et al., 1977), such that deviance is generally registered most distinctly
and represents the actual driver of the observed differences.
Moreover, several parameters that have been identified over the years as mediating and
moderating social influence should be considered more explicitly in future investigations.
One could thus gain a more comprehensive overview of the mechanisms of social influence,
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revealing which cognitive principles apply to whom, when, under what circumstances, to
what extent, and so forth. For example, the influence of motives for conformity (Deutsch &
Gerard, 1955), the role of a person’s identity and self-categorization (Abrams, Wetherell,
Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990), the effect of personality (Crutchfield, 1955; DeYoung,
Peterson, & Higgins, 2002), the impact of cognitive mode (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Ca-
cioppo, 1996), and the role of certainty, investment, and difficulty (Baron et al., 1996)
could be controlled for or, even better, manipulated. This would deepen our understand-
ing of social influence and address the abovementioned issue of separate levels of analysis
that should be joined, rather than merely coexist.
Also, the mechanisms that have been identified in neuroscientific research to contribute to
social influence might be transferred to different domains of psychological inquiry. Specifi-
cally, the idea that our basic representations are molded by norms and that reinforcement-
learning processes play a key role suggests that individual differences related to these
functions should be associated with the susceptibility to social influence. For example,
participants who habitually tend to process information intensely might be less prone to
the influence of norms (see Publication II ), possibly even shielding veridical sensory input
more vigorously from a fusion with the afflux of norm-based expectations. Therefore,
participants scoring high on need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) should tend to
conform less to others than those scoring low on need for cognition. Moreover, one of the
most influential theories of personality includes the central tenet that individuals differ
in the sensitivity to reinforcement, presumably based on functional and structural varia-
tions in the underlying neural circuits (for an overview, see, e.g., Corr, 2002, 2004, 2013;
Leue & Beauducel, 2008; Reuter, Cooper, Smillie, Markett, & Montag, 2015). Seeing
as this appears to be an essential mechanism of social influence, people scoring high on
sensitivity to punishment and reward (Torrubia, Avila, Moltó, & Caseras, 2001) should
be more likely to conform to others than those scoring low on these variables. In fact, in
a preliminary study that has not yet been published, I have tested and confirmed both
predictions at the level of trait scales: Using participants’ scores on a scale that taps into
trait conformity (Mehrabian & Stefl, 1995), I have found need for cognition to be a robust
negative predictor of conformity, while sensitivity to punishment and sensitivity to reward
were positive predictors. All three variables remained predictive when controlling for so-
ciodemographic variables and basic personality features. However, future research clearly
needs to extend these data by testing whether actual conformal behavior—rather than
self-reported tendencies to adopt other people’s views—is related to personality charac-
teristics such as need for cognition and reinforcement sensitivity. Recent studies from the
field of genetic neuroimaging indirectly suggest that a person’s neurobiological predispo-
sition to process reinforcement explains part of our susceptibility to social influence (for
an overview, see Falk et al., 2012).
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Finally, future research should try to apply the insight that we have gained so far to
real-world issues related to social influence. As a first step, one might continue the line of
basic research, but monitor more relevant aspects of behavior that are known to be prone
to social influences, such as eating behavior (Cruwys et al., 2015), reckless driving (Falk et
al., 2014), or alcohol intake (Graham, Marks, & Hansen, 1991). Explicitly determining the
neurocognitive predictors of such behavior could allow us to adjust measures of prevention
or remedy accordingly (Albert et al., 2013; Cascio, Scholz, & Falk, 2015; Stallen & Sanfey,
2015). Only recently, it has been shown that using methods of cognitive neuroscience to
validate persuasive communications could be used to improve health-related campaigns
(Falk et al., 2016). Likewise, communications based on social norms, such as in anti-
drug campaigns, might be tailored more precisely to reach the respective audiences more
successfully (Stallen et al., 2013).
5.5 Concluding Remarks
In the present synopsis, I have introduced the long tradition of research into social influ-
ence, the novel neurocognitive approach in this field, and my own contributions to the
subject. Evidently, much has been achieved and understood thus far, but there is still
plenty to explore in the future. The fact that other people’s behavior has such a pro-
found and thorough impact on our own overt behavior and even our most basic cognitive
operations is as striking as it is unmasking. We are exposed to a rich and complex social
environment, yet tend to perceive ourselves as separate entities, navigating through the
world in a self-determined, independent way. While this is not entirely inaccurate, it is
a gross overstatement. Our construal of reality seems to be the fusion of more or less
veridical sensory input and the wealth of social influences surrounding us. Yet this is not
an admission of weakness or sloth, but perhaps the simple truth that we have much to
gain from using others not only as a means of cohesion and belonging, but also as a source
of information that helps us tackle the intricacies of the world.
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